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PRIVATE ORDERING OF EMPLOYEE PRIVACY:
PROTECTING EMPLOYEES¶ EXPECTATIONS OF
PRIVACY WITH IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
RIGHTS
LINDSAY NOYCE*
With the growth of technology in the workplace, employee privacy is an
increasingly significant legal issue. Employees, perhaps irrationally,
often overestimate the amount of privacy they should expect in
technological communication. A United States Supreme Court decision
in June 2010, City of Ontario v. Quon, highlights the importance of
privacy in the workplace and emplo\HHV¶ SULYDF\ expectations.
Although various constitutional, tort, and statutory causes of action
protect employee privacy, each theory has limitations and ultimately
fails to protect some reasonable expectation of privacy. Some courts
have recognized an implied-in-fact contract theory in the context of
employment law, often to protect job security. The implied-in-fact
contract theory may be a valuable avenue for the protection of
employee privacy. A court applying an implied-in-fact contract theory
to protect employee privacy will determine whether the employer and
employee reached an enforceable agreement, albeit an implied
DJUHHPHQWUHJDUGLQJWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSULYDF\ULJKWVE\FRQVLGHULQJWKH
WRWDOLW\ RI WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV DQG WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH
expeFWDWLRQV:KHUHRWKHUFDXVHVRIDFWLRQIDLOWRSURWHFWDQHPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace, the implied-in-fact
contract theory may be available as an alternative. To align employer
and employee expectations, employers should consider this potential
cause of action when establishing polices and practices bearing on
employee privacy issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Technology continues to be an increasingly important part of American
life inside and outside the workplace. E-mail is often the preferred form of
communication between co-workers. In daily interactions, text messaging
has taken over as a primary form of quick communication. Anyone familiar
with technological communication may assume some inherent sense of
privacy associated with these activities. Even when communicating in fora
accessible by the public, such as social networking sites, employees often
do not consider that their employers and co-workers can readily gain access
to this information. If an employee working entirely from home maintains a
social networking page on which her privacy preferences permit only
certain people to view her information, is it reasonable for the employee to
expect her information will be kept private from her employer and coworkers that do not have access to her information? Certainly, the
employee should not expect privacy with respect to those to whom the
employee has granted permission to view her networking page. There is an
innate tension between an employee intentionally making information
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public and feeling that her information is private. Yet, with the expansion
of social networking, growing use of technology in the workplace, and
feeble boundariHVEHWZHHQZRUNDQGKRPHHPSOR\HHV¶HOHFWURQLFSULYDF\
is a pressing legal issue. A recent United States Supreme Court case, City
of Ontario v. Quon,1 brought employee privacy issues to the forefront of
current legal discourse.
Whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a
common theme in causes of action protecting employee privacy. When an
employee accesses a password-protected e-mail account or sends a text
message on a cell phone, even a company-issued phone, it is
understandable that the employee instinctively feels a sense of privacy in
the content of the communication.2 But is it reasonable for an employee to
expect privacy in the contents of e-mails sent while at work? Is it
reasonable to expect privacy if the employee is on company time but off
the work premises? Or in text messages sent using a company phone? Is it
reasonable for an employee to expect privacy in messages, materials, or
conversations that refer to off-GXW\DFWLYLWLHVVXFKDVWKHHPSOR\HH¶VGDWLQJ
life? The circumstances of the workplace and the actions taken by the
HPSOR\HU ZLOO GLFWDWH ZKHWKHU DQ HPSOR\HH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ LV
reasonable.3 When an employee does have a reasonable expectation of
privacy and the employer breaches that expectation, the employee might
assert breach of an implied contractual right to privacy. Where
constitutional, tort, and statutory causes of action fail to provide a remedy
IRU DQ HPSOR\HU YLRODWLRQ RI DQ HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI
privacy, the implied-in-fact contract might fill the gaps left by these other
causes of action.4 This breach of contract claim may be asserted
irrespective of any adverse employment action being taken against the
employee.
Whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is
important in several causes of action that an employee may assert against

1.
130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
2.
But cf. id. at 2629±30 (hesitating to declare that employees have reasonable
expectations of privacy vis-à-vis employer-provided technological equipment, because
courts must have knowledge and experience to weigh such expectations and cell
phones and text messages are too recent of a development to predict the future
consequences of a broad holding).
3.
Cf. id. (noting that an employee¶s expectation of privacy is also influenced by
³ZKDWVRFLHW\DFFHSWVDVSURSHUEHKDYLRU´LQWKHFRQWH[WRIQHZWHFKQRORJ\ 
4.
See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private
Lives, 66 LA. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2006) (suggesting that an implied contract right to
privacy might alleviate the potential unfair practice of employers offering privacy
rights through policy statements but then ignoring such policies when the employer
finds it convenient to do so).
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an employer, when the employee claims a protectable privacy interest.5
Those causes of action, particularly the implied-in-fact contract, and the
importance of the employeH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\ZLOODSSHDU
in the subsequent parts of this Article. Part II will explore the development
of privacy issues in the workplace and the interaction of employee privacy
rights with employment at-will.6 Part III will discuss the implied-in-fact
employment contract as well as how such a contract may encompass
privacy rights and create protectable employee privacy interests.7 Part III
will also look at the related doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing that some courts have held is implicit in all employment
contracts, including employment at-will contracts, and how this covenant
might protect employee privacy.8 Part IV will explore the Fourth
Amendment privacy rights of public sector employees, including the recent
United States Supreme Court case City of Ontario v. Quon, and will
suggest how the circumstances in Quon could support a successful claim
for breach of an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy in many states.9
Finally, Part V will summarize the various sources of privacy rights in the
employment context and discuss the importance of private ordering.10
II. CREATING PRIVACY RIGHTS IN AN AT-WILL WORKPLACE
With the growing use of technology in the workplace, employee privacy
rights are an important legal concern for employers as well as employees.
Before exploring any particular causes of action for employee privacy, it is
necessary to understand how privacy fits within the law generally and how
it specifically fits in the employment relationship. Privacy has become a
common legal issue in various areas of the law, including employment
law.11 The evolution of a right to privacy began with an 1890 article by
5.
See generally Robert Sprague, Orwell was an Optimist: The Evolution of
Privacy in the United States and its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 83 (2008) (exploring the difficulties and development of the legal
right to privacy as it developed in the United States).
6.
See infra Part II (discussing both the common law and statutory exceptions to
the at-will employment doctrine).
7.
See infra Part III.A±B.1 (analyzing state court opinions that have sustained
implied contracts as an exception to at-will employment).
8.
See infra Part III.B.1±2 (noticing the subtle interplay between implied contracts
and implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing).
9.
See infra Part IV (arguing that in some jurisdictions the employee in City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) might have prevailed in protecting his privacy
ULJKWVXQGHUDQLPSOLHGFRQWUDFWWKHRU\UDWKHUWKDQXQGHUWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFXUUHQW
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
10. See infra Part V (concluding that when employees have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, causes of action sounding in contract might afford them the
most flexible legal protection).
11. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
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Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, who urged courts to recognize a right
to privacy that would protect citizens from intrusions by the press.12
:DUUHQDQG%UDQGHLVGHVFULEHGWKLVULJKWWRSULYDF\DV³WKHULJKWWREHOHW
DORQH>@´GHULYLQJIURPWKHULJKWWROLIHIRXQGLQWKH'XH3URFHVV&ODXVHRI
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.13 Since then,
privacy has evolved and expanded in the United States, and legal privacy
rights exist in common law, constitutional law, and statutes.14 Under each
source of privacy protection, the proponent of the protection must have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.15 An employee asserting a legal right to
privacy, regardless of the source of that right, must demonstrate a
reasonable expectation of privacy.16
&RPSHWLQJ ZLWK DQ HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDF\ H[SHFWDWLRQ are WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
legitimate business interests. Courts balance these competing interests
against one another to determine whether an employer violation of an
HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ ZDV XQZDUUDQWHG RU
unreasonable under the circumstances.17 Academic literature has
recognizeG WKDW SULYDF\ LQ WKH ZRUNSODFH LV ³GLIILFXOW WR UHFRQFLOH´ ZLWK
employment at-will, the default in employment contracts.18 To understand
REV. 193, 195 (1890) (FULWLFL]LQJ³LQVWDQWDQHRXVSKRWRJUDSKVDQGQHZVSDSHU>IRU@
LQYDG>LQJ@ WKH VDFUHG SUHFLQFWV RI SULYDWH DQG GRPHVWLF OLIH´ ; See also Selmi, supra
note 4, at 1038± FDOOLQJSULYDF\ WKH³ODZ¶VFKDPHOHRQVHHPLQJO\ HYHU\ZKHUHDQG
QRZKHUH DW WKH VDPH WLPH´ DQG VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW SULYDF\ KDV EHFRPH D ODUJHU LVVXH LQ
employment law, in part, because lifetime employment historically facilitated trust but
KDV EHFRPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ XQOLNHO\ LQ WRGD\¶V Hmployment environment); James A.
Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-Duty Behavior,
43 GA. L. REV. 133, 137 (2008) (arguing the demand for employers to supply nonwork-related benefits, such as health care benefits, has invLWHGHPSOR\HUVLQWRZRUNHUV¶
SULYDWH OLYHV LQ RUGHU IRU WKH HPSOR\HU WR DVFHUWDLQ ZKHWKHU WKH HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDWH
activities are costing the employer money).
12. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11DW ³2IWKHGHVLUDELOLW\²indeed of
the necessity²of some such protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press
LVRYHUVWHSSLQJLQHYHU\GLUHFWLRQWKHREYLRXVERXQGVRISURSULHW\DQGRIGHFHQF\´ 
13. See id. DW ³*UDGXDOO\WKHVFRSHRIWKHVHOHJDOULJKWVEURDGHQHGDQGQRZ
the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life²the right to be let alone´ 
14. See Sprague, supra note 5, at 93±109 (tracing the development of privacy rights
in the United States).
15. See id. at 93 (noting that protecting the home and a reasonable expectation of
privacy invaded by unreasonable intrusion are common themes in privacy causes of
action).
16. See id. DW H[SODLQLQJWKDWDSULYDWHHPSOR\HHPD\DVVHUWDQ³LQWUXVLRQXSRQ
VHFOXVLRQFODLP´LQVWHDGRIDGLUHFW)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWclaim, but the starting question
is still whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy).
17. See id. at 111±13 (discussing how other areas of law may lead some employers
to intrude too far into monitoring employees in order to detect and stop behavior that
may subject employers to liability).
18. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 4, DW ³Another curious aspect of the privacy
literature . . . is that . . . it frequently ignores workplace issues . . . [because] how can an
employee assert a right to privacy when he or she has so few rights to begin with?´ 
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how privacy issues fit into employment law, it is essential to examine the
employment at-will doctrine and its exceptions.
A. Employment At-Will and Its Exceptions
The increasing willingness of courts to acknowledge exceptions to
employment at-will, including the implied-in-fact contract for job security,
demonstrates that courts are likely to accept the implied-in-fact contract as
a theory of protecting employee privacy. An implied-in-fact contract for
employee privacy is an exception to employment at-will for an employee
ILUHG EDVHG RQ HYLGHQFH REWDLQHG WKURXJK D EUHDFK RI WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy. It is a well-settled rule of law that,
absent an express employment contract to the contrary, the employment atwill doctrine is the default rule in the vast majority of United States
jurisdictions.19 The employment at-ZLOOUXOHSURYLGHVWKDW³HLWKHUSDrty may
terminate the service, for any cause, good or bad, or without cause, and the
RWKHU FDQQRW FRPSODLQ LQ ODZ´20 The Payne court, often cited for its
articulation of the at-will rule,21 also held that the cause of termination
could be morally wrong without attachment of legal liability.22 Although
19. See Matthew W. Finkin, Shoring up the Citadel (At-Will Employment), 24
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1,    GHVFULELQJWKH$PHULFDQ/DZ,QVWLWXWH¶VGUDIW
restatement on the law of employment as construing the at-will employment rule as a
³ZHOOHVWDEOLVKHG´GHIDXOWUXOH TXRWLQJ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 3.01 cmt. a (Discussion Draft 2006))); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to Working
Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Putting the
Restatement in its Place, 13 EMPL. RTS. & EMP. POL¶Y J. 143, 154 (2009) (suggesting it
would be a waste of political capital for advocates of reform to debate whether
employment at-will is in fact the default rule). But see Montana Wrongful Discharge
From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (2009) (abrogating the atwill employment doctrine by making it a wrongful discharge for an employer to
terminate an employee without good cause, provided that the employee has completed
WKHHPSOR\HU¶VSUREDWLRQDU\SHULRGRIHPSOR\PHQW .
20. See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 517±19 (1884) (preferring that
individual choice regarding whether to work govern the relationship between employer
and employee, rather than a rule imposed by law), overruled in part, Hutton v. Watters,
179 S.W. 134 (1915); see also Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The
Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 653±54 (2000) (defining
employment at-will as allowing either party to terminate the relationship for any
reason, without liability).
21. See, e.g., Ballam, supra note 20, at 687 (calling the Payne FRXUW¶VGHVFULSWLRQ
WKH ³FODVVLF H[SRVLWLRQ´ RI WKH HPSOR\PHQW DW-will rule); Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing
Human Capital: Toward a New Foundation for Employment Termination Law, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 112 n.1 (2006) (citing Payne for the point that
employers have an unrestricted right to terminate employees who do not have an
employment contract for a definite term); Nadjia Limani, Righting Wrongful
Discharge: A Recommendation for the New York Judiciary to Adopt a Public Policy
Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL¶Y & ETHICS J.
309, 313 n.26 (2006) (relying on the Payne FRXUW¶V DUWLFXODWLRQ RI WKH at-will
employment doctrine).
22. See Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519±20 (explaining that a threat to discharge is not an
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most American employees are employed at-will, there are numerous
common law and statutory exceptions to the doctrine. In fact, a right to
employee privacy might be characterized as an exception to the
employment at-will rule.
Despite employment at-will, common experience demonstrates that
employers are not, in fact, empowered to terminate an employee for
absolutely any reason. For example, an employer cannot lawfully terminate
an employee because of the employeH¶V UDFH23 But employees often
overestimate their legal protections and believe an employer would be
liable for terminating an employee out of personal animus.24 While it is
arguably not a sound business practice,25 under employment at-will,
personal dislike is a perfectly valid reason for terminating an employee.26
Up against this framework, one might presume that an employer can
OHJDOO\WHUPLQDWHDQHPSOR\HHEDVHGRQDQHPSOR\HH¶VSHUVRQDOFKRLFHVRU
conduct that an employer does not agree with, but the analysis is not so
simple. The trend in employment law has been to invalidate the legality of
terminations when there is no good cause.27 Exceptions to the pure
employment at-will rule are numerous and include federal and state
statutes, discharges in violation of public policy, and implied contracts.28
illegal act).
23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2006) (prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of race, as well as color, sex, religion, and national origin).
24. See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong are Employees About their Rights, and
Why Does it Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 9 (2002) (discussing studies in which
³DSSUR[LPDWHO\QLQHW\SHUFHQW of employees VXUYH\HGEHOLHYHGWKDWLWZDVµXQODZIXO¶WR
fire an employee based on personal dislike (citing Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning,
and Law: ([SORULQJWKH,QIOXHQFHVRQ:RUNHUV¶/HJDO.QRZOHGJH, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
447, 456-67, 462 (1997))  ³2ver eighty percent believed that it was illegal for an
employer to fire an employee in order to hire another willing to do the same job for a
ORZHUZDJH´Id.
25. See Erica Worth, In Defense of Targeted ERIPs: Understanding the Interaction
of Life-Cycle Employment and Early Retirement Incentive Plans, 74 TEX. L. REV. 411,
411, 415 (1995) (observing that, even in the context of worker productivity and old
DJHHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWLQFHQWLYHSODQVVHUYHDVD³UHODWLYHO\SDLQOHVVZD\>IRUHPSOR\HUV@
to ease oldeU HPSOR\HHV RXW RI WKH ZRUN IRUFH´ VLQFH ³D ZRUNHU ZKR OHDYHV KDSS\ LV
OHVV OLNHO\ WR VXH´ WKDQ RQH ZKR LV ILUHG RXWULJKW²no matter how illegal such an act
might be).
26. See Ballam, supra note 20, at 653 (recognizing that employers are able to
terminate the employment relationship at their discretion). But cf. Alex Long, The
Disconnect Between At-Will Employment and Tortious Interference with Business
Relations: Rethinking Tortious Interference Claims in the Employment Context, 33
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491, 491±92 (2001) (pointing out that although an employer may be able
to terminate an employee out of simple dislike, a supervisor ZKRDFWVRXWRI³SHUVRQDO
KRVWLOLW\´PD\EHOLDEOHXQGHUDFODLPRIWRUWXRXVLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQV 
27. See Ballam, supra note 20, at 687 (predicting an increasing abrogation of the
at-will employment doctrine in the twenty-first century).
28. See Ann L. Rives, <RX¶UH 1RW WKH %RVV RI 0H $ &DOO IRU )HGHUDO /LIHVW\OH
Discrimination Legislation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 555 (2006) (explaining that
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The employment at-will rule applies only to the termination of the
employment relationship, but an employee need not be discharged or
experience any adverse employment action for the employee to assert a
breach of an implied contractual right to privacy when the employer has
YLRODWHG WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ ,Q such a
scenario, it is not accurate to characterize an implied-in-fact contract right
to privacy as an exception to the at-will rule, because this right may operate
LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI DQ\ FKDQJH LQ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V HPSOR\PHQW VWDWXV <HW
when an employer terminates an employee in conjunction with a breach of
the employee¶V privacy rights, such a cause of action essentially acts as an
exception to employment at-will.
B. Employee Privacy Protection as an Exception to Employment At-Will
The growing concern over employee privacy rights has contributed to
the erosion of the employment at-will doctrine.29 If an employer could
terminate an employee for absolutely any reason, it is impossible to discern
how an employee could successfully exercise any right to privacy. For
instance, if an employee refuses to submit to a drug test or reveal a piece of
information to her employer, the employer could simply terminate the
employee, leaving her without legal recourse.30
With regard to employee privacy, there are federal and state
constitutional protections;31 statutory protections, such as off-duty conduct
statutes prohibiting employers from discharging workers for certain
conduct occurring outside of work premises;32 common law privacy and
four major public policy exceptions protect employees: refusal to commit illegal acts,
exercise of statutory rights, whistleblower activities, and performance of civic duties).
29. See Ballam, supra note 20, at 685±87 (discussing how the traditional at-will
doctrine has been tempered through abusive discharge torts, public policy limitations,
prohibitions on fraudulent inducements, promissory estoppel, and increasing concern
for privacy rights).
30. See id. at 686±87 (suggesting an employee lacks privacy rights if she is unable
to make free choices because she is fearful of losing her job).
31. See, e.g. 2¶&RQQRU Y 2UWHJD  86     KROGLQJ that
³>L@QGLYLGXDOVGRQRWORVHFourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the
JRYHUQPHQWLQVWHDGRIDSULYDWHHPSOR\HU´ 
32. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2009) (making it aQ ³XQIDLU
employment practice for an employer to terminate . . . any employee due to that
employee¶s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during
QRQZRUNLQJ KRXUV´ ZLWK FHUWDLQ H[HPSWLRQV  Additionally, there are various federal
statutes protecting specific areas of employee privacy. See Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (2006) (banning employer use of
polygraph testing for pre-employment screening); Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (Supp. II 2008) (foreclosing the
use of genetic information in employment decisions by employers); Americans with
'LVDELOLWLHV $FW ³$'$´ , 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006) (prohibiting employers from
inquiring about whether an applicant is disabled unless the inquiry is job-related and
consistent with business necessity).
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public policy tort protections;33 and contractual protections.34 It is possible
to frame these as sources of employee privacy protection or as exceptions
to employment at-will. The former is probably a more accurate
characterization because an employer might infringe upon an employee¶V
right to privacy absent termination.35 In the employment context, there are
three basic kinds of intrusions that may give rise to an employee privacy
claim: surveillance, such as monitoring e-mail and telephone
communications; testing, such as drug testing or medical testing; and
LQTXLU\ LQWR DQ HPSOR\HH¶V RII-duty conduct, such as political and
recreational activities.36 Surveillance and testing involve more of an
intrusion than inquiry into off-duty conduct, because²while perhaps not
WKH HPSOR\HU¶V EXVLQHVV²off-duty conduct involves personal facts more
than it involves private information.
Privacy protections may be available to employees to defend against
each of these intrusions. In the employment relationship, one possible
source of employee privacy protection is an implied-in-fact contract.37
:KHQDQHPSOR\HU¶VDFWLRQVFUHDWHDUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\IRU
the employee, the implied-in-fact contract may be available to the
employee to assert protectable privacy rights. An implied right to privacy
can protect against each type of intrusion, whether surveillance, testing, or
inquiry into off-duty conduct, if the employee has a reasonable expectation
of privacy based upon the circumstances of the workplace. The success of
33. See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1992)
UHO\LQJ RQ WKH FRPPRQ ODZ WRUW RI LQYDVLRQ RI SULYDF\ WR KROG DQ HPSOR\HH¶V
discharge contrary to public policy).
34. Cf. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND
ITS LIMITATIONS 301 (2007) (observing that parties can contractually agree to the extent
RI WKH HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDF\ ULJKWV WKURXJK SULYDWH RUGHULQJ²which may be either
express or implied).
35. )RU H[DPSOH DQ HPSOR\HU PLJKW PRQLWRU DQ HPSOR\HH¶V FRPPXQLFDWLRQ LQ D
PDQQHU WKDW EDVHG XSRQ HPSOR\HU SROLFLHV DQG SUDFWLFHV YLRODWHV WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy, thereby violating the employeH¶V ULJKW WR SULYDF\
regardless of any adverse employment action against the employee. The contract is
breached by the intrusion of privacy rather than by terminating or disciplining the
employee. See infra Part III (discussing causes of action based upon an implied
contract right to privacy).
36. Case examples used in this Article will involve situations under each of these
intrusions. See infra Part III.B-IV.A and accompanying text.
37. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1043 (recognizing that, although privacy
expectations are generally inconsistent with the employment relationship, an implied
FRQWUDFWULJKWPD\DULVHZKHQ³WKHHPSOR\HUWROHUDWHVRUSHUPLWVFHUWDLQDFWLRQV´DQGLW
LV³PDQLIHVWO\XQIDLUIRUDQHPSOR\HUWRFRQIHUSULYDF\ULJKWVWKURXJKSROLcies, written
or implied, and then to turn around and ignore those policies when it is advantageous to
do so.´ see also Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment
Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 715 (1996) (cautioning that proponents of market
HIILFLHQF\EHOLHYH³WKHSDUWLHVWRDQHPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQVKLS>FDQ@EHVW
MXGJHWKHLULQWHUHVWV>@´DQGFRXUWVVKRXOGOHDYHSULYDF\PDWWHUVWRSULYDWHEDUJDLQLQJ 
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an alleged implied-in-fact contract right will depend heavily on the
FLUFXPVWDQFHV EXW LW LV DQ DYDLODEOH FDXVH RI DFWLRQZKHQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
conduct creates and subsequently violates aQ HPSOR\HH¶V reasonable
expectation of privacy.
III. IMPLIED-IN-FACT EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: A LESSER±KNOWN
VEHICLE FOR ENFORCING PRIVACY RIGHTS
While it is rare for parties to an employment relationship to bargain out
of the at-will paradigm, the default rule allows for this opportunity.38 The
terms of an employment contract are those to which the parties agree, and
as with other types of contracts, employment contracts may contain implied
terms.39 According to a 2007 survey, forty-five states recognize the implied
contract as a common law exception to the employment at-will rule.40
Differences in the law in this area exist because common law causes of
action arising under state law differ from state to state. In some states,
implied-in-fact contract theories can establish a right to job security.41 The
1981 California case, 3XJK Y 6HH¶V &DQGLHV ,QF,42 is regarded as the
seminal employment law case recognizing an implied employment
contract.43
A. Implied-in-Fact Contracts for Job Security
In Pugh, the issue was whether the plaintiff, a long term and loyal
employee of the company, had an implied contractual right to for cause
38. See Matthew W. Finkin et al., Proceeding, Working Group on Chapter 2 of the
Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13
EMPL. RTS. & EMP. POL¶Y J. 93, 110 (2009) (suggesting that the at-will default is likely
to last because little negotiation occurs at the outset of most employment relationships,
many workers do not understand or are not aware of the default rule, and there is often
unequal bargaining power between the parties).
39. See id. at 114-15 (discussing the proposed text of a RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW).
40. See Sonne, supra note 11, at 160 (noting that common law exceptions to
employment at-will demonstrate a policy toward modifying the default rule for
FLUFXPVWDQFHVEH\RQGWKHHPSOR\HH¶VFRQWURORUIRUWKHSXEOLFJRRG).
41. See id. at 159±160 (discussing how many states rely on implied contracts,
including those found in employer handbooks and manuals and oral representations, to
limit the at-will doctrine).
42. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981), disapproved of by *X] Y %HFKWHO 1DW¶O
Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
43. See, e.g., Finkin et al., supra note 38, at 114±15 (illustrating, through Pugh, the
factors courts consider in determining whether an implied employment contract exists);
Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 358 (2008) (noting that the California courts first
addressed the implied employment contract issue four months prior to the Pugh
decision in Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980) but that
Pugh LVWKH³PRUHIDPRXVGHFLVLRQ´ 
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termination.44 The court laid out various factors to ascertain whether an
implied-in-fact employment contract existed: payment of independent
consideration; the personnel policies and practices of the company; the
HPSOR\HH¶VORQJHYLW\DWWKHFRPSDQ\DFWLRQVDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQVRIWKH
employer; and industry practice.45 Whether an implied-in-fact employment
contract exists is a fact-specific analysis that requires considering the
totality of the circumstances.46 /RRNLQJ WR WKH ³WRWDOLW\ RI WKH SDUWLHV¶
UHODWLRQVKLS>@´ WKH Pugh court held that the employee had established a
prima facie case that his employer breached an implied employment
FRQWUDFWE\FRQVLGHULQJWKHSODLQWLII¶VGXUDWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQWSUDLVHDQG
promotions received; lack of criticism; oral assurances; and employer
policies.47 In other words, based on their implied-in-fact contract, the
employer could only discharge Pugh if the employer had good cause.48
Courts and commentators have recognized that the concept espoused by
the court in Pugh²QRWUHTXLULQJFRQVLGHUDWLRQLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHZRUNHU¶V
continued employment²correctly applies general contract principles to the
employment context.49 Allowing implied-in-fact contract terms in
44. See Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918±920 (explaining that ³>D@IWHU  \HDUV RI
HPSOR\PHQW ZLWK 6HH¶V &DQGLHV ,QF LQ ZKLFK KH ZRUNHG KLV ZD\ XS WKH FRUSRUDWH
ladder from dishwasher to vice president :D\QH3XJKZDVILUHG´ 
45. See id. at 925±26 (holding independent consideration²consideration other than
WKHZRUNHU¶VFRQWLQXHGHPSOR\PHQWZLWKWKHFRPSDQ\²to be but one factor of many
to consider in the analysis).
46. See Foley v. Interactive 'DWD &RUS  3G    &DO   ³>7@KH
WRWDOLW\RIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVGHWHUPLQHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´ see also Dupree v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 956 F.2d 219, 222 (10th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that the
inquiry regarding whether an implied contract right exists is normally a factual one);
Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776, 780 (N.M. 1993) (examining written
representations such as employee handbooks, oral representations, party conduct, and
the combination of representations and conduct).
47. See Pugh, 171 Cal. Rtpr. at 329 (remanding with the instruction that the
employer had the burden of proving Pugh was terminated for cause); see also Pugh v.
6HH¶V&DQGLHV,QF (Pugh II), 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 195, 214 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming
WKHWULDOFRXUW¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDW3XJKKDGEHHQWHUPLQDWHGIRUFDXVH 
48. See 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926± QRWLQJ KRZHYHU WKDW ³ZKHUH DV KHUH WKH
employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must
of necessity be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment.´ 
49. See Foley3GDW REVHUYLQJWKDWUHTXLULQJ³VHSDUDWHFRQVLGHUDWLRQDV
DVXEVWDQWLYHOLPLWDWLRQ´WRWKHILQGLQJRIDQHQIRUFHDEOHFRQWUDFW³ZRXOGEHµFRQWUDU\
to the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶´ TXRWLQJ CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-3 (2d ed. 1977)));
Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924±25 (noting that requiring consideration other than
continued employment is inconsistent with the general rule for contract formation that
courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration (citing CALAMARI & PERILLO,
CONTRACTS § 4-3 (2d ed. 1977))). See also Eales v. Tanana Valley Med.-Surgical Grp.,
663 P.2d 958, 960 (Alaska 1983) (finding the independent consideration requirement
XQVRXQG XQGHU FRPPRQ ODZ FRQWUDFW UXOHV EHFDXVH ³>W@KHUH LV QR UHTXLUHPHQW RI
mutuality of obligation with respect to contracts formed by an exchange of a promise
for performance.´ , Fineman, supra note 43, at 362 (explaining that Pugh and Foley
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employment contracts will not negate the at-will rule; implied contract
rights arise only when it appears from the circumstances that the parties
intended to be contractually bound to implied contract terms.50 In practice,
courts differ in their degree of acceptance of implied-in-fact employment
contract terms.51 Some courts formalistically require offer, acceptance, and
consideration, while other courts adopt a more fact-specific approach
IRFXVHG RQ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ 7KH 7HQWK &LUFXLW &RXUW RI
Appeals, applying Colorado law, rejected the argument that an employee
can aggregate employer-issued documents into a legally binding contract
without showing the elements of a contract were met as to each
document.52 In contrast, some courts have held that implied contracts are
HQIRUFHDEOH EDVHG XSRQ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQV53
Consequently, the jurisdiction will determine whether the empOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectations will be sufficient to recognize and enforce an
implied-in-fact contract or whether the exchange must formally meet all of
the elements of a contract.
B. Potential for Implied-in-Fact Contracts Protecting Employee Privacy
Where employer actions and representations create reasonable
expectations of employee privacy, jurisdictions that recognize an impliedin-fact employment contract would acknowledge an implied contract right
to privacy because that right is negotiable and can be altered by contract.54
applied general contract principles to the employment relationship).
50. See Foley  3G DW  ³3HUPLWWLQJ SURRI RI DQG UHOLDQFH RQ LPSOLHG-infact contract terms does not nullify the at-will rule, it [sic] merely treats such contracts
LQDPDQQHULQNHHSLQJZLWKJHQHUDOFRQWUDFWODZ´ 
51. See Dupree  )G   QRWLQJ D ³>K@LJK WKUHVKROG IRU LQYRNLQJ WKH
LPSOLHG FRQWUDFW GRFWULQH´  Ball v. Ark. Dep't of Cmty. Punishment, 10 S.W.3d 873,
876 (Ark. 2000) (requiring a manual or handbook to contain an express agreement to
be sufficient to invoke the exception for an implied-in-fact employment contract);
Adams v. Pre Finish Metals, Inc., No. WD-96-039, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2053, *12±
13 (Ct. App. May 16, 1997) (holding that handbooks and manuals will rarely be
sufficient to create an implied-in-fact contract right if the employee could not otherwise
establish a promissory estoppel claim based on the same facts).
52. See Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1464±65 (10th Cir. 1994)
HODERUDWLQJWKDWXQGHU&RORUDGRODZWKHHPSOR\HHPXVWEHDZDUHRIWKHHPSOR\HU¶V
SROLF\ DQG VXFK SROLF\ PXVW LQIOXHQFH WKH HPSOR\HH¶V FRQWLQXHG HPSOR\PHQW to
constitute an acceptance). But see Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d
1257, 1268 n.10 (N.J. 1985) (holding that an employee need not rely on²or even be
aware of²an employer policy in order to benefit from it and for it to create an implied
contract right).
53. See Fineman, supra note 43 DW  ³>7@KH >Foley and Pugh] decisions also
LQFRUSRUDWH WKH LGHD WKDW LPSOLHG FRQWUDFWV DUH HQIRUFHDEOH EHFDXVH RI HPSOR\HHV¶
reasonable expectations . . . . This is potentially a different inquiry than whether the
HPSOR\HU¶VDFWLRQVDQGSROLFLHVH[SUHVVDQLQWHQWWRRIIHUMRESURWHFWLRQV´ 
54. See, e.g., Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 209 F.3d 1122, 1130±31 (9th
&LU  KROGLQJWKDWDQ³REMHFWLYHO\UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\´GHSHQGVRQ
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An implied-in-fact contract claim may arise when an employee has been
terminated, and feels as though her privacy rights were infringed, because
VKH KDG D UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ EDVHG XSRQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
conduct and policies.55 7KH HPSOR\HH¶V claim can be framed as a narrow
way of arguing that her at-will employment status was negated by an
implied contract right to privacy.56 The employee, however, need not be
terminated in order to assert a breach of contract claim for violating the
HPSOR\HH¶V ULJKW WR SULYDF\ )RU H[DPSOH DQ HPSOR\HH PD\ KDYH D
contractual right to privacy in the content of text messages sent using a
company issued phone. If the employer accesses the content of an
HPSOR\HH¶V WH[W PHVVDJHV WKH employee could bring suit against the
employer for breach of contract, even if the employer did not terminate the
HPSOR\HHEDVHGRQWKRVHPHVVDJHV,WLVWKHWHUPVRIWKHSDUWLHV¶FRQWUDFW
that will determine what actions constitute a breach, and the emplo\HH¶V
reasonable expectations will assist the court in ascertaining those terms.57
An implied-in-fact contract for employee privacy may become
enforceable when an employer makes representations to an employee that
JLYH ULVH WR WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[Sectation of privacy in some
aspect of her job or personal life and the employer breaches those
representations. The employee may assert a cause of action for breach of an
implied-in-IDFW FRQWUDFW SURWHFWLQJ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDF\ 7KH PRUH
specific and definite the assurances given by the employer, the more likely
it is a court will find that the assurances created an implied-in-fact contract
right.
In 1992, the Tenth Circuit considered whether an employee acquired
privacy rights based on an implied contract under Oklahoma law.58 In
Dupree v. United Parcel Service, two employees were terminated after
the deal struck between labor and employment because consent is usually a defense to a
privacy action).
55. See, e.g., Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that the employee had an asserted expectation to a right to privacy based on
existing policies), disapproved of by *X] Y %HFKWHO 1DW¶O ,QF  3G  &DO
2000).
56. In fact, a handful of employee-plaintiffs have advanced such an argument. See,
e.g., Vasey, 29 F.3d at 1464 (asserting an implied-in-fact contract right based, in part,
on written representations that the employer would respect the dignity and privacy of
employees); Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222 (advancing an implied-in-fact contract right
based on oral and written statements that employees would be treated fairly);
Greenrock v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 08-CV-404-TCK-TLW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36360, *1±2 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 28, 2009) (claiming employer actions violated an
implied-in-fact contract right that employees be treated with respect and dignity).
57. See Vasey, 29 F.3d aW  ILQGLQJ WKDW D PDQXDO FRQWDLQLQJ ³YDJXH
DVVXUDQFHV´GLGQRWFUHDWHDFRQWUDFWEHFDXVHWKHHPSOR\HHFRXOGQRWKDYHUHDVRQDEO\
concrete expectations of what those assurances meant).
58. Dupree, 956 F.2d at 219.
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word of their romantic involvement spread around the office.59 The
employees argued an implied contract voided their at-will status by
creating certain privacy ULJKWV DQG EDVHG WKHLU FODLP RQ ³UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
>WKDW@ZHUHPDGHWRWKHPERWKRUDOO\DQGLQSROLF\PDQXDOV´60 The Tenth
Circuit enumerated the following five factors as critical to the evaluation of
whether an implied contract exists under Oklahoma law: ³ D HYLGHQFHRI
VRPHµVHSDUDWHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶EH\RQGWKHHPSOR\HH¶VVHUYLFHWRVXSSRUWWKH
implied term, (b) longevity of employment, (c) [provisions in] employer
KDQGERRNV DQG PDQXDOV G  WKH HPSOR\HH¶V GHWULPHQWDO UHOLDQFH RQ RUDO
statements and company policies and practices, and (e) promotions and
FRPPHQGDWLRQV´61 The court acknowledged the inquiry is a factual one
typically to be decided by a jury, but VWLSXODWHG³[i]f the alleged promises
are nothing more than vague assurances . . . the issue can be decided as a
PDWWHU RI ODZ´62 The statement relied on by the employees in the
FRPSDQ\¶V SROLF\ PDQXDO²³:H 7UHDW 2XU 3HRSOH )DLUO\ DQG :LWKRXW
)DYRULWLVP´²was held by the court to be too vague, as a matter of law, to
create an implied contract right to privacy.63
Two years later, the Tenth Circuit approached a similar argument
applying Colorado law in Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp.64 There, the
employee worked for the employer for thirty-three years in various
positions before being terminated in a round of layoffs.65 The court
discussed the procedural requirements for an implied-in-fact employment
contract, holding that the employee must prove the employer made an offer
WRWKHHPSOR\HHDQGWKHHPSOR\HH¶VLQLWLDORUFRQWLQXHGVHUYLFHTXDOLILHGDV
acceptance and consideration.66 Further, for a handbook or manual to
59. Id. at 220±21.
60. Id. at 222.
61. Id. But cf. Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct. App. 1984)
(discussing that some jurisdictions do not require separate consideration and consider
such a requirement to be contrary to general contract principles against inquiring into
the sufficiency of consideration), disapproved of by *X]Y%HFKWHO1DW¶O,QF3G
1089 (Cal. 2000).
62. Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222.
63. Id.
64. 29 F.3d 1460, 1460 (10th Cir. 1994).
65. Id. at 1463.
66. See id. at 1464 (elaborating that to qualify as an offer, the employer must have
³manifested his willingness to enter into a bargain in such a way as to justify the
employee in understanding that his assent to the bargain was invited by the employer
and that the employee¶s assent would conclude the bargain.´). Dupree and Vasey were
both decided by the Tenth Circuit, but in Dupree separate consideration was a
prerequisite to finding an implied employment contract whereas in Vasey the
HPSOR\HH¶V FRQWLQXHG VHUYLFH FRXOG EH VXIILFLHQW FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WR VXSSRUW DQ LPSOLHG
employment contract. The difference is due to the Dupree court applying Oklahoma
law and the Vasey court applying Colorado law.
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constitute an offer under Colorado law, it must be communicated to the
employee.67 The employee in Vasey relied on statements in company
PHPRV WKDW WKH HPSOR\HUZDV FRPPLWWHGWR ³WKH GLJQLW\ DQG SULYDFy due
DOO KXPDQ EHLQJV´ WR SURYLGLQJ ³D VDIH DQG KHDOWK\ ZRUNSODFH´ DQG WKH
HPSOR\HU³EHOLHYHVLQWKHKLJKHVWHWKLFDOVWDQGDUGV´68 Like in Dupree, the
FRXUW KHOG WKHVH JHQHUDO VWDWHPHQWV ZHUH ³YDJXH DVVXUDQFHV´ DQG WRR
indefinite to contractually bind the employer to an implied contract.69
Another example of a court rejecting privacy assurances in an employee
manual as too vague is the Oklahoma Supreme Court case Gilmore v.
Enogex, Inc.70 Gilmore was terminated for refusing to submit to a random
drug test conducted on all employees.71 Gilmore asserted breach of an
implied contract right to privacy based on the employee manual which
provided: ³[t]he Company will respect the privacy of its employees and
will involve itself in their personal lives only to the extent that job
performance or conflict of interest is involved or where assistance
programs are made available on a voluntary participation basis.´72 The
court recognized it is possible for an employee manual or handbook to give
rise to an implied contract, but rejected that the cited provision was
sufficient to implicate an implied contract right to privacy.73 While
arguably more specific than the handbook statements in Dupree and Vasey,
WKH 2NODKRPD 6XSUHPH &RXUW KHOG WKDW *LOPRUH¶V LPSOLHG FRQWDFW FODLP
was insufficient because the employee handbook provision did not contain
DQ\VSHFLILFWHUPVRQO\³YDJXHDVVXUDQFHV´74

67. See id. (HODERUDWLQJWKDW³DQHPSOR\HU¶VOLPLWHGGLVWULEXWLRQRILWVHPSOR\PHQW
manual or policy indicates the employer did not intend the manual to operate as a
contractual offer to the employee (citing Kuta v. Joint Dist. No. 50(J), 799 P.2d 379,
382 (Colo. 1990))). But see Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1268
n.10 (N.J. 1985) (observing that, with regard to employer policy manuals, ³HPSOR\HHV
neither ha[ve] to read it, know of its existence, or rely on it to benefit from its
provisions any more than employees in a plant that is unionized have to read or rely on
a collective-EDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQWLQRUGHUWRREWDLQLWVEHQHILWV´ 
68. Vasey, 29 F.3d at 1465.
69. Id.
70. 878 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1994).
71. Id. at 362.
72. See id. at 368 (emphasis omitted) (looking to the text of the employee manual
WR LGHQWLI\ LI DQ LPSOLHG FRQWUDFW H[LVWHG  7KH HPSOR\HH¶V RULJLQDO SXEOLF SROLF\
DUJXPHQWZDVUHMHFWHGEHFDXVH³when [his] privacy concerns [were] balanced against
Enogex¶legitimate interest in providing a drug-free workplace, his invasion-of-privacy
claim fails to meet the law's highly-offensive-to-a-reasonable-person WHVW´Id. at 366±
67.
73. Id. at 368.
74. See id DW  ³7KLV FRXUt, while willing to imply the existence of a contract
and construe the terms, will not imply terms in the context of obscure or ambiguous
ODQJXDJH´ 

42

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:1

Although these cases failed to hold that an implied contract right to
privacy was created, each of them did accept that such a right may exist
where there were more definite assurances of privacy protection.75 While
the Tenth Circuit and the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not give any
guidance as to what kind of statement would be sufficiently specific and
definite to give rise to an implied contract right to privacy, these cases
indicate some courts will require definite and specific promises of privacy
from employers in order to find an implied contract right to privacy.76 A
TXHVWLRQRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDQHPSOR\HH¶Vimplied contract right to privacy
can be framed as whether the totality of the circumstances suffices to create
a reasonable expectation of privacy for the employee.77 For the employees
in Dupree, Vasey, and Gilmore, the lack of specificity in the handbook
made those provisions insufficient to create reasonable privacy
expectations; it was not reasonable for these employees to rely on the
handbook statements.78 In contrast to the higher threshold required under
Oklahoma and Colorado law to find implied contract rights with regard to
employee privacy,79 other courts have been more willing to invoke the
doctrine.80
1. The Implied Contract Doctrine: Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp.
Contrary to the cases described above, courts occasionally find that an
implied contract right to privacy exists. Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp. has
been cited as recognizing an implied contract for certain employee privacy
protection.81 The Rulon-Miller FRXUW UHOLHG KHDYLO\ RQ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
75. E.g., id.
76. E.g., Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1464 (10th Cir. 1994);
Dupree v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 956 F.2d 219, 222±23 (10th Cir. 1992).
77. See, for example, Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222±ZKLFKUHOLHGRQWKHHPSOR\HH¶V
understanding of employer-issued materials, as well as the representations of those
materials for determining the existence of an implied contract.
78. :KHQIUDPHGLQWHUPVRIWKHHPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\WKH
analysis is similar to that of a Fourth Amendment analysis²protecting citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures by government actors²for public employees.
79. See id. (referencing the requirement of definite promises in order to create an
enforceable contractual right (citing Krause v. Dresser Indus., Inc. 910 F.2d 674, 678
(10th Cir. 1990))); see also Gilmore, 878 P.2d at 368 (explaining the requirements of
an implied contract).
80. See Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 533 (Ct. App. 1984)
(XSKROGLQJ D MXU\ YHUGLFW ILQGLQJ WKH HPSOR\HU EUHDFKHG DQ HPSOR\HH¶V LPSOLHG
contract right to privacy), disapproved of by *X] Y %HFKWHO 1DW¶O ,QF  3G 
(Cal. 2000).
81. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 4, at 1043± FDOOLQJWKHFRXUW¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRIDQ
LPSOLHG FRQWUDFW ULJKW RI HPSOR\HH SULYDF\ WKH ³PRVW LPSRUWDQW DVSHFW´ RI WKH FDVH 
See also Terry Morehead Dworkin, ,W¶V 0\ /LIH²Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job
Employee Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 47, 78 (1997) (discussing
that Rulon-Miller¶V DQDO\VLV RI a breach of implied contract rights can be used in the
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H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ DV LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V FRQGXFW 5XORQMiller worked her way through the ranks at IBM from receptionist to
marketing manager.82 Before her final promotion, Rulon-Miller was in a
relationship with an employee of an IBM competitor.83 Rulon-0LOOHU¶V
superiors assured her the relationship was not an issue but later told her it
FUHDWHG D ³FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVW,´ DQG VKH PXVW HQG LW RU ORVH KHU MRE84 A
manager told her she had time to think it over, only to terminate her the
following day.85
Rulon-Miller, and the court, relied on an IBM memo issued to managers
VWUHVVLQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIHPSOR\HHV¶SULYDF\LQWKHLURII-the-job lives.86
7KHFRXUWVXPPDUL]HGWKHFRPSDQ\SROLF\DV³RQHRIQRFRPSDQ\LQWHUHVW
in the outside activities of an employee so long as the activities did not
interfere with the work of the ePSOR\HH´87 While IBM claimed D³FRQIOLFW
RI LQWHUHVW´ DV WKH UHDVRQ IRU 5XORQ-0LOOHU¶V WHUPLQDWLRQ WKH FRXUW
GHWHUPLQHGWKHUHZDVVXIILFLHQWHYLGHQFHWRXSKROGWKHMXU\¶VILQGLQJWKDW
the romantic relationship did not create a conflict of interest.88 The court
XSKHOG WKH MXU\¶V ILQGLQJ WKDW Rulon-Miller had a right to privacy in her
SHUVRQDO URPDQWLF OLIH EDVHG RQ ³VXEVWDQWLYH GLUHFW FRQWUDFW ULJKWV   
IORZLQJWRKHUIURP,%0SROLFLHV´89 In upholding that Rulon-Miller had an
implied contract right to privacy, the court may have also relied on the
context of privacy rights); Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment
Law: Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 43 n.79 (2001)
(describing Rulon-Miller DV³>D@ZHOO-known case that can be understood on contract
JURXQGV´ DQG FLWLQJ WKH SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW ³>L@n the private sector . . . workers rarely
succeed in their claims unless they can show that the employer held out the expectation
RIUHVSHFWLQJSULYDF\DQGWKHQEUHDFKHGWKHH[SHFWDWLRQ´ 
82. Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 527±28.
83. Id. at 528.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 528±29.
86. See id. at 529±30 (stating that Rulon-Miller relied on company policies and,
according to DPHPRLVVXHGWR,%0PDQDJHUV³,%0¶VILUVWEDVLFEHOLHILVUHVSHFWIRU
the individual, and the essence of this belief is a strict regard for his right to personal
SULYDF\´ 7KLVSROLF\GRHVQRWDSSHDUDQ\PRUHVSHFLILFWKDQWKHVWDWHPHQWVUHOLHGRQ
by the employee in Gilmore. Contra Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 368 (Okla.
1994) (discussing that the employee actually received and had knowledge of the
employee manual containing a statement that ³[t]he Company will respect the privacy
of its employees and will involve itself in their personal lives only to the extent that job
performance or conflict of interest is involved or where assistance programs are made
available on a voluntary participation basis.´). Yet, the California court in Rulon-Miller
was willing to accept that an implied contract right to privacy existed while the
Oklahoma Supreme Court was not. This divergence PD\EHGXHWRWKHFRXUWV¶GLIIHULQJ
acceptance and willingness to invoke the implied-in-fact contract to protect employee
privacy.
87. 208 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 532.
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assurances made by Rulon-0LOOHU¶V VXSHUYLVRUV WKDW WKH UHODWLRQVKLS ZDV
not a problem.90 In sum, the court found sufficient evidence to support that
Rulon-Miller had a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the
HPSOR\HU¶VFRQGXFW91
The court clearly affirmed that company policy established that IBM had
no interest in the off-duty conduct of an employee unless the conduct
LQWHUIHUHG ZLWK WKH HPSOR\HH¶V ZRUN92 Assuming the Rulon-Miller court
was in fact finding an implied contract right, the court primarily relied upon
the written policy distributed to IBM managers.93 Conceivably, the court
could have based this conclusion on the fact that Rulon-0LOOHU¶VVXSHULRUV
knew of and permitted the relationship when promoting her.94 While a
written policy will usually be stronger evidence of an implied contract
right, an implied-in-fact contract takes all of the facts and circumstances
into consideration in determining whether such a contract right exists.95

90. See id. at 528 (recounting, in some detail, Rulon-0LOOHU¶V VXSHUYLVRU¶V
testimony informing her that he did not ³have any problem with [her relaWLRQVKLS@´
SULRUWRKROGLQJWKDWVKHFRXOGUHDVRQDEO\UHO\XSRQ,%0¶VZULWWHQSULYDF\SROLFLHV .
91. Framing this issue as one of reasonable reliance is similar to a promissory
estoppel analysis, which allows an employee to recover based upon reasonable reliance
RQ D GHILQLWH SURPLVH E\ WKH HPSOR\HU ZKHUH UHOLDQFH LV WR WKH HPSOR\HH¶V GHWULPHQW
and nonenforcement would be unjust. See Estrin v. Natural Answers, Inc., 103 F.
$SS¶[ WK&LU (listing the elements of a promissory estoppel claim as:
³ D FOHDU DQG GHILQLWH SURPLVH  ZKHUH WKH SURPLVRU KDV D reasonable expectation
that the offer will induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; 3. which
does induce actual and reasonable action or forbearance by the promisee; and 4. causes
DGHWULPHQWZKLFKFDQRQO\EHDYRLGHGE\WKHHQIRUFHPHQWRIWKHSURPLVH´  Nguyen
v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 241 (4th Cir. 1995) (defining promissory estoppel as
DOORZLQJ³recovery even in the absence of consideration where reliance and change of
position to the detriment of the promisee make it unconscionable not to enforce the
promise.´) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also Coats v.
Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 78012, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1699, *22 (Ct. App.
Apr. 12, 2001) (holding summary judgment to be appropriate on a promissory estoppel
claim where the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy).
92. Rulon-0LOOHU¶V ³VXEVWDQWLYH GLUHFW FRQWUDFW ULJKWV´ EDVHG RQ ,%0¶V FRPSDQ\
SROLFLHV PDNHV WKH FRXUW¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH FRYHQDQW RI JRRG IDLWK DQG IDLU GHDOLQJ
implicit in employment at-will contracts unnecessarily confusing. Perhaps in a
jurisdiction that recognizes both causes of action, it is a legal distinction without a
practical difference. Although it may be immaterial if the result is the same, it is
unclear whether the court couched its analysis on a breach of an implied contract right
derived from the circumstances or a breach of an implicit covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. See Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
93. See id. DW  HQXPHUDWLQJ WKH SROLF\ VHW IRUWK E\ ,%0¶V IRUPHU FKDLUPDQ
FOHDUO\VWDWLQJWKHHPSOR\HH¶VULJKWWR privacy).
94. See id. DW  UHFRXQWLQJ D FRQYHUVDWLRQ GHPRQVWUDWLQJ PDQDJHPHQW¶V
knowledge of the relationship).
95. See, e.g., Dupree v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 956 F.2d 219, 222 (10th Cir.
1992) (acknowledging that the ³inquiry [regarding] whether an implied contract right
H[LVWV LV >D@ IDFWXDO´ RQH  Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 388 (Cal.
1988) ³>7@KHWRWDOLW\RIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVGHWHUPLQHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´ 
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While the Rulon-Miller court did not explicitly discuss how the facts met
common law contract requirements, the exchange²even absent the IBM
policy²can fit within the contract definition of a bargained-for exchange
consisting of an offer, an acceptance, and consideration. Prior to receiving
the promotion, Rulon-Miller was promised by her superior that her
romantic relationship was not an issue.96 In offering her the promotion, it
was an understood condition of her acceptance that she could continue the
relationship. In accepting the promotion, Rulon-Miller was accepting, as a
condition of her new employment contract, that she could stay in the
relationship while working in her new position. Her continued service to
the company in the promoted position constituted consideration.
The facts can be analyzed to meet the elements of a contract, but crucial
to finding an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy LV WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation. The assurances by her supervisors could induce a
reasonable expectation that what the supervisors said was accurate, and the
relationship was not a problem. Based on the representations by her
superiors, Rulon-Miller did have a reasonable expectation that her
relationship was not a matter of concern for her employer, and this
reasoQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ VKDSHG E\ KHU HPSOR\HU¶V FRQGXFW FUHDWHG DQ
implied contract right.97 Under the facts of the case, it does seem RulonMiller was treated unfairly by her long time employer. The court indicated
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could provide RulonMiller with relief because IBM failed to afford Rulon-Miller the protection
of a company policy. Similarly, other decisions have invoked the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to protect employee privacy
rights.98
2. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Luedtke v.
Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.
The Rulon-Miller court made reference to the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing present in employment at-will contracts.99 The
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is another cause of action an

96. Rulon-Miller testified her manager stated to KHU ³, GRQ¶W KDYH DQ\ SUREOHP
ZLWK>WKHUHODWLRQVKLS@<RX¶UHP\QXPEHURQHSLFN,MXVWZDQWWRDVVXUH\RXWKDW\RX
DUHP\VHOHFWLRQ´Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
97. See Rulon-Miller, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 528±29 & nn. 2±3 (recounting RulonMiOOHU¶V WULDO FRXUW WHVWLPRQ\ RI WKH FRQYHUVDWLRQV WKDW WRRN SODFH EHWZHHQ KHU DQG
management).
98. See, e.g., Leudtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1223±24
(Alaska 1992) (identifying a covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a qualification
of the at-will employment rule).
99. See Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222 (discussing the Rulon-Miller FRXUW¶VKDQGOLQJRI
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
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employee may assert against an employer to allege infringement of the
HPSOR\HH¶V right to privacy.100 Implied contract rights and the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing are similar but distinct theories.
While forty-five states recognized the implied contract theory as of 2007,
only nine recognized the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
theory.101 The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing affords the
employee the protection of employer policies without requiring the court to
find that such policies created an implied contract.102 Thus, an employee
PLJKW DVVHUW ERWK FDXVHV RI DFWLRQ ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDF\
rights when a finding of such privacy rights is supported by an employer
policy. As the name of the covenant indicates, courts often rely on fairness
principles to determine if an employer violated the implied covenant of
JRRG IDLWK DQG IDLU GHDOLQJ HYHQ DEVHQW WKH HPSOR\HU¶V YLRODWLRQ RI D
company policy.
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. is one case in which a court held
that the employer violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Luedtke was terminated after testing positive for marijuana.103 The
Alaska Supreme Court held that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is implied in all at-will employment contracts, and its breach is determined
E\ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V LQWHQW DQG EDG IDLWK104 :KLOH WKH FRXUW¶V DQDO\VLV
UHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKHGUXJWHVWZDVDWHUPRI/XHGWNH¶VHPSOR\PHQWFRQWUDFW,
it did not hold that an implied contract right to privacy prohibited the
employer from drug testing him. Rather, the court held that the employer
did not treat Luedtke fairly, noting that he was tested for drugs without
notice when other employees were not similarly tested.105 This analysis
100. See Sonne, supra note 11, at 145±46 (listing the limitations to employment atwill with regard to privacy, including implied contract rights and the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing), Rives, supra note 28, at 555 (discussing cause for termination);
see also Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions,
124 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 2001, at 3, 4 (analyzing the implied contract and the
covenant of good faith and faith dealing as two of the three major common law
exceptions to employment at-will, with public policy being the third major exception).
101. See Sonne, supra note 11, at 160, n.149 (citing JOHN F. BUCKLEY, IV &
RONALD M. GREEN, 2007 STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES LAW § 5.02
tbl. 5.1 (2007)).
102. See, e.g. WILLIAM E. HARTSFIELD, Wrongful Discharge, 2 INVESTIGATING
EMPLOYEE CONDUCT § 14:13 n.19 (2010) (surveying decisions recognizing the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing regarding employee privacy), available at
Westlaw IEMPC.
103. See Luedtke, 834 P.2d at 1222 (noting that the employee was given neither the
opportunity to retest nor any other options).
104. See id. at 1223±24 (citing Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska
1983)).
105. See id. at 1225± ³:HDJUHHWKDWWKHUHLVQRHYLGHQFHRIVXEMHFWLYHEDGIDLWK
RQ 1DERUV¶ SDUW EXW DV ZH KDYH DOUHDG\ stated, the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing also requires that the employer be objectively fair. The superior court found
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IRFXVHV RQ IDLUQHVV EDVHG RQ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI
SULYDF\ GXH WR WKH HPSOR\HU¶V DFWLRQV²rather than fitting the
circumstances into the requirements of contract formation. Luedtke had a
reasonable expectation that he would not be tested for drugs because he
was not given advance notice and no other employees were tested.106
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing may afford an employee
protection in some states when the circumstances do not amount to a
mutually bargained-for exchange within a contract framework, the
HPSOR\HU¶VFRQGXFW reasonably causes the employee to expect privacy, and
the treatment of the employee is manifestly unfair.107 Yet, most state
judiciaries have rejected the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in employment contracts based on the justification that such a cause of
action would deviate too far from the employment at-will doctrine.108 The
underlying inquiries in an implied-in-fact contract case and an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing case are the same²did the
employee have a reasonable expectation of privacy? Employee privacy
expectations are central to other causes of action as well; public employees
are afforded constitutional protection where the employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy based on the realities of the workplace.

that Luedtke was tested for drug use without prior notice, that no other employee was
similarly tested, and that Nabors suspended Luedtke immediately upon learning of the
results of the test. Nabors does not dispute these findings. We hold as a matter of law,
WKHVHIDFWVFRQVWLWXWHDYLRODWLRQRIWKHFRYHQDQWRIJRRGIDLWKDQGIDLUGHDOLQJ´ 
106. Id.
107. According to a 2000 study, the following states recognized the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment at-will contracts: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, Utah,
and Wyoming. See Muhl, supra note 100, at 4, Ex. 1. The analysis for finding a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is similar to the implied-in-fact
FRQWUDFWDQDO\VLVLQMXULVGLFWLRQVWKDWIRFXVRQWKHHPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQV
rather than strictly requiring that the circumstances meet the elements of contract
formation.
108. See, e.g., 0XUSK\ Y %DQFURIW &RQVWU &R  ) $SS¶[   G &LU
2005) (recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
at-will relationships in Delaware, but qualifying that this exception has a narrow
DSSOLFDWLRQEHFDXVHWKHFRYHQDQW³FRXOGVZDOORZWKHGRFWULQHRIHPSOR\PHQWDWZLOO´
(citing Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 401±03 (Del. 2000))); Pittman v. Larson
Distribution Co., 724 P.2d 1379, 1385 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to extend the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment contracts); White v. State, 929
P.2d 396, 407 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) UHIXVLQJ³WRDGRSWDEURDGµEDGIDLWK¶H[FHSWLRQ
to the employment-at-will rule which would have implied a covenant of good faith and
IDLU GHDOLQJ LQ HYHU\ HPSOR\PHQW FRQWUDFW´ EHFDXVH VXFK DQ H[FHSWLRQ ZRXOG LQWUXGH
too greatly upon the employment relationship). But see Thomas C. Kohler & Matthew
W. Finkin, Bonding and Flexibility: Employment Ordering in a Relationless Age, 46
AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 382 (1998) (noting that an implied covenant of good faith and fair
GHDOLQJ RQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V SDUW LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK DQ DW-will relationship, according to
many state courts).
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IV. PRIVACY RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
For public employees, the analysis can be quite different because the
government-employer must comply with the protections of the Fourth
$PHQGPHQWWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV&RQVWLWXWLRQJXDUDQWHHLQJWKH³ULJKWRIWKH
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
XQUHDVRQDEOH VHDUFKHV DQG VHL]XUHV´ E\ JRYHUQPHQW DFWRUV109 Under the
implied-in-fact contract analysis, whether the employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy is a hidden inquiry because courts have not
explicitly stated what the standard is. In contrast, under the Fourth
Amendment analysis for public employees, courts expressly inquire
whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy.110 The
8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVKHOGWKDW³>L@QGLYLGXDOVGRQRWORVH)RXUWK
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of
a private employer. The operational realities of the workplace, however,
may make some employees¶ expectations of privacy unreasonable when an
LQWUXVLRQ LV E\ D VXSHUYLVRU UDWKHU WKDQ D ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW RIILFLDO´111
Under the Ortega framework, in order to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, a public employee must have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and the government-HPSOR\HU¶VLQWUXVLRQPXVWEHXQUHDVRQDEOH112
Whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a
threshold analysis to be determined on a case-by-case basis considering all
RI WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV DQG ³RSHUDWLRQDO UHDOLWLHV´ RI WKH ZRUNSODFH113 This
ad hoc determination may look similar to the analysis of whether an
implied-in-fact contract exists as both require the court to take account of
the totality of the FLUFXPVWDQFHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V SROLFLHV
practices, and representations.114
A. City of Ontario v. Quon
Quon exemplifies the similarities and overlap of the privacy rights of

109. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
110. See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 906 (9th Cir.
2008) GLVFXVVLQJDSROLFHRIILFHU¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\DQGKROGLQJLWWR
be reasonable), UHY¶G VXE QRP City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). In
Quon, the Supreme Court distanced itself from the holding that a reasonable
expectation of privacy is a threshold requirement in Fourth Amendment employee
privacy cases. See 130 S. Ct. at 2628-29. After Quon, it is unclear what the correct
analytical framework is for a public employee Fourth Amendment claim.
111. 2¶&RQQRUY2UWHJD86  (plurality opinion) (emphasis in
original).
112. Id. at 725±26.
113. Id. at 717±18.
114. For discussion regarding the totality of the circumstances analysis for an
implied contract, see supra note 43±45 and accompanying text.
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public employees under the Fourth Amendment and a cause of action for
an implied contract right to privacy. Quon worked as a sergeant for the
Ontario Police Department and received a two-way pager from his
employer.115 Quon signed an acknowledgement of a policy regarding
computer, Internet, and E-mail usage, which stated, in part, WKDW ³>X@VHUV
should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these
UHVRXUFHV´116 Quon was aware that, while there was no official policy
regarding employer-issued pagers, the pager messages would fall under the
computer, Internet, and E-mail usage policy.117 When an employee
exceeded the contracted-for 25,000±character±per±month allotment,
/LHXWHQDQW'XNH4XRQ¶VVXSHUYLVRUZRXOGFROOHFWSD\PHQWIURPWKHXVHU
for these overages.118 4XRQ ZHQW RYHU KLV SDJHU¶V FKDUDFWHU DOORWPHQW
several times and was told by Duke that so long as Quon paid for the
overages, the department would not conduct an audit to determine whether
they were personal or business in nature.119 Quon paid the overages for
several months and his pager messages were not audited; however, an audit
ZDV ODWHU FRQGXFWHG E\ UHYLHZLQJ WKH SDJHU WUDQVFULSWV DQG 4XRQ¶V
superiors found that many of his pager messages were personal and
sexually explicit.120 The principal harm suffered by Quon was that various
persons within the department reviewed the content of the pager messages.
Quon filed suit asserting constitutional protections in the content of the
pager messages under the Fourth Amendment, and the district court held
that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages due to
'XNH¶V LQIRUPDO SROLF\ RI QRW DXGLWLQJ D SDJHU LI WKH HPSOR\HH SDLG WKH
overuse charges.121 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit agreed and held that, although the employer had a policy purporting
that there should be no expectation of privacy by employees, the
115. Quon, 529 F.3d at 895.
116. See id. at 896 (reserving for the government-employer the right to review
HPSOR\HH¶V ³QHWZRUN DFWLYLW\´ ZLWK RU ZLWKRXW QRWLFH however cautioning that such
systems should not be used for personal matters).
117. See id. (observing that, while Quon testified he remembered the meeting where
the policy was announced, he did not recall his supervisor announcing that the
'HSDUWPHQW¶VH-mail policy would cover the pager messages).
118. Id. at 897 ³8QGHU WKH &LW\¶V FRQWUDFW ZLWK $UFK :LUHOHVV HDFK SDJHU ZDV
DOORWWHGFKDUDFWHUVDIWHUZKLFKWKH&LW\ZDVUHTXLUHGWRSD\RYHUDJHFKDUJHV´ .
119. Id 7KH SDUWLHV¶ GHVFULSWLRQV RI WKH H[FKange differed. According to Duke, he
WROG4XRQ³WKDW>4XRQ@KDGWRSD\IRUKLVRYHUDJHWKDW,GLGQRWZDQWWRGHWHUPLQHLI
the overage was personal or business unless they wanted me to, because if they said,
µ,W¶VDOOEXVLQHVV,¶PQRWSD\LQJIRULW¶WKHQ,ZRXOGGRDQDXGLWWRFRQILUPWKDW´Id.
4XRQ TXRWHG 'XNH DV VWDWLQJ WKH IROORZLQJ ³LI \RX GRQ¶W ZDQW XV WR UHDG LW SD\ WKH
RYHUDJHIHH´Id.
120. Id. at 898. The stated purpose of the audit was to determine whether the 25,000
character allotment was sufficient to cover business use of the pagers. Id.
121. Id. at 899.
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³RSHUDWLRQDOUHDOLW\´DWWKH'HSDUWPHQWZDVFRQWUDU\WRWKLVSROLF\122 The
FRXUWUHOLHGRQWKH³RSHUDWLRQDOUHDOLW\´RI'XNH¶VLQIRUPDOSROLF\ZKLFK
he made particularly clear to Quon²that employee pagers would not be
audited if the employee paid any overage fees.123 In addition to relying on
this informal policy, the court considered the employer practice of not
DXGLWLQJ4XRQ¶VSDJHUPHVVDJHV for several months when Quon exceeded
his monthly character allotment and paid for his overages.124 Thus, the
court considered the oral representations of the employer as well as its
policies and practices and concluded Quon did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the pager messages.125
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued an
opinion on June 17, 2010.126 One of the questions presented to the Court
was whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy when
WKH HPSOR\HU¶V DFWXDO SUDFWLFH DQG LQIRUPDO SROLF\ GLIIHUHG IURP WKH
official employer policy.127 In their respective briefs, the parties agreed that
the reasonable expectation of privacy test is a fact-specific inquiry but
differed on which facts they advocated before for the Court. Quon urged
WKH YLHZ WKDW DQ HPSOR\HH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ PXVW EH determined
based on all the circumstances of the employment relationship and focused
WKH &RXUW¶V DWWHQWLRQWR 'XNH¶V informal policy and actual practice of not
DXGLWLQJ WKH RIILFHUV¶ SDJHU PHVVDJHV128 The employer, also using a
³WRWDOLW\RIWKHRSHUDWLRQDOUHDOLWLHV´WHVWXUJHGWKH&RXUWWRFRQFHQWUDWHRQ

122. Id. at 906±07.
123. Id. at 907.
124. See id ³4XRQ KDG H[FHHGHG WKH  FKDUDFWHU OLPLW µWKUHH RU IRXU WLPHV¶
and he had paid for the overages every time without anyone reviewing the text of the
PHVVDJHV´ 
125. See id GLVPLVVLQJWKH&LW\¶VDUJXPHQWWKDW'XNHFRXOGQRWFUHDWHDUHDVRQDEOH
expectation of privacy because he was not a policymaker). Unimportant for the
purposes of this Article, the Ninth Circuit also held that the search was unreasonable
DQG WKXV YLRODWHG 4XRQ¶V )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW ULJKWV See id. at 909 (concluding that
UHYLHZLQJ WKH FRQWHQW RI WKH WH[W PHVVDJHV ³ZDV H[FHVVLYHO\ LQWUXVLYH LQ OLJKW RI WKH
QRQLQYHVWLJDWRU\REMHFWRIWKHVHDUFK´ 
126. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
127. See AM. BAR ASS¶N, Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases: April
Cases 2009±2010 Term: City of Ontario, CA v. Quon, Docket No. 08-1332,
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/april2010.shtml (last visited Nov. 29,
  IROORZ ³4XHVWLRQV 3UHVHQWHG´  ³:KHWKHU D 6:$7 WHDP PHPEHU KDV D
reasonable expectation of privacy in text-messages transmitted on his SWAT pager,
where the police department has an official no-privacy policy but a non-policymaking
lieutenant announced an informal policy of allowing some personal use of the
SDJHUV´ 
128. See Brief of Respondent at 39±41, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010) (No. 08-1332) (arguing that workplace circumstances are important and that an
HPSOR\HU¶V DQQRXncement that employees do not have a privacy expectation, without
considering those circumstances, is not a legitimate regulation).
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the factors GLPLQLVKLQJ 4XRQ¶V expectation of privacy, including that the
SDJHUZDVLVVXHGE\WKHHPSOR\HUDQGWKHGHSDUWPHQW¶VIRUPDOQR-privacy
policy.129
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, determinHGWKDWWKHFDVH³>FRXOG@
be resolved by settled principles [to determine] when a search is
UHDVRQDEOH´UDWKHUWKDQGHOYLQJLQWRWKHUHDVRQDEOHQHVVRIWKHHPSOR\HH¶V
privacy expectations.130 The Court assumed Quon did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy DQG DYRLGHG WKH ³RSHUDWLRQDO UHDOLWLHV´ LVVXH131
+RZHYHU LQ GLFWD WKH &RXUW GLVFXVVHG WKH SDUWLHV¶ GLVDJUHHPHQW RYHU
whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy and noted that
ZKHWKHU 'XNH¶V RUDO VWDWHPHQWV FRQVWLWXWHG D FKDQJH LQ WKH 'HSDUWPHQW¶V
SROLF\ ZRXOG EHDU RQ WKH UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI 4XRQ¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ132 The
&RXUW FDXWLRQHG DJDLQVW WKH RYHUH[SDQVLRQ RI DQ HPSOR\HH¶V ³UHDVRQDEOH
H[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\´LQQHZIRUPVRIWHFKQRORJ\133 Yet, the Court noted
that clearly defined employer policies wLOO KDYH DQ HIIHFW RQ HPSOR\HHV¶
reasonable expectations.134
Because the Court wanted to avoid a broad determination of employee

129. Brief of Petitioner at 41±45, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
(No. 08-1332).
130. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2624.
131. See id. at 2628±29 (sidestepping the two-part framework used in the Ortega
SOXUDOLW\ EXW VWDWLQJ ³ZHUH ZH WR DVVXPH WKDW LQTXLU\ LQWR µRSHUDWLRQDO UHDOLWLHV¶ ZHUH
FDOOHG IRU´ LW ZRXOG EH QHFHVVDU\ WR FRQVLGHU WKH IDFWV EHDULQJ RQ WKH OHJLWLPDF\ of
4XRQ¶VH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\LQKLVSDJHUPHVVDJHV After Quon, it is unclear whether
the Court has rejected the Ortega SOXUDOLW\ DSSURDFK LQ IDYRU RI -XVWLFH 6FDOLD¶V
DSSURDFK ³+LV RSLQLRQ ZRXOG KDYH GLVSHQVHG ZLWK DQ LQTXLU\ LQWR µRSHUDWLRQDO
realLWLHV¶ DQG ZRXOG FRQFOXGH µthat the offices of government employees . . . are
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.¶ But he would also
KDYHKHOGµWKDWJRYHUQPHQWVHDUFKHVWRUHWULHYHZRUN-related materials or to investigate
violations of workplace rules²searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and
normal in the private-employer context²GRQRWYLRODWHWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW¶´Id. at
 DOWHUDWLRQ LQ RULJLQDO  FLWDWLRQV RPLWWHG  FLWLQJ 2¶&RQQRU Y 2UWHJD  86
709, 731±32 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
132. See id. at 2629. ³>,@W ZRXOG EH QHFHVVDU\ WR DVN ZKHWKHU 'XNH¶V VWDWHPHQWV
could be taken as announcing a change in OPD policy, and if so, whether he had, in
fact or appearance, the authority to make such a change and to guarantee the privacy of
text messaging. It would also be necessary to consider whether a review of messages
sent on police pagers, particularly those sent while officers are on duty, might be
justified for other reasons, including performance evaluations, litigation concerning the
ODZIXOQHVVRISROLFHDFWLRQVDQGSHUKDSVFRPSOLDQFHZLWKVWDWHRSHQUHFRUGVODZV´ 
133. See id. at 2629±30 (elaborating that the evolution of technology as it relates to
LQIRUPDWLRQWUDQVPLVVLRQ³LVHYLGHQWQRWMXVWin the technology itself but in what society
DFFHSWVDVSURSHUEHKDYLRU´DQG³LWLVXQFHUWDLQKRZZRUNSODFHQRUPVDQGWKHODZ¶V
treatment of them, will evolve.´  ³3UXGHQFH FRXQVHOV FDXWLRQ EHIRUH WKH IDFWV LQ WKH
instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and
extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided
FRPPXQLFDWLRQGHYLFHV´Id. at 2629.
134. Id. at 2630.
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expectations of privacy in employer-provided communication devices, it
assumed Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy and held, more
narrowly, that the search was reasonable DQGGLGQRWYLRODWH4XRQ¶V Fourth
Amendment rights.135 In discussing whether the search was too intrusive,
WKH &RXUW DJDLQ FRQVLGHUHG WKH UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI 4XRQ¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RI
privacy and determined WKDW 4XRQ¶V FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW KLV PHVVDJHV ZHUH
completely private in all circumstances was unreasonable.136 The Court
ultimately held that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding the search
unreasonable.137
While the Court did not directly address whether Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the content of his pager messages, it did generally
state the factors a court should consider when approaching the issue.138 The
&RXUW¶V GLFWD UHJDUGLQJ DQ HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\
may be persuasive in future breach of implied contract cases. The facts in
Quon could potentially give rise to an implied-in-fact contract claim for a
private sector employee for whom a constitutional cause of action is
unavailable.
The conclusion by the Ninth Circuit that Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the pager messages is similar to finding that Quon
had an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy in the pager messages based
on the oral assurances, policies, and practices of his public employer. The
CRXUW XVHG WKH ³RSHUDWLRQDO UHDOLWLHV´ ODQJXDJH from the Ortega &RXUW¶V
opinion139 to refer WR 'XNH¶V LQIRUPDO SROLF\ DQG SUDFWLFH RI QRW DXGLWLQJ
pagers when employees paid their overage fees.140 The use of looking at
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2631 ³(YHQLIKHFRXOGDVVXPHVRPHOHYHORISULvacy would inhere in his
messages, it would not have been reasonable for Quon to conclude that his messages
ZHUHLQDOOFLUFXPVWDQFHVLPPXQHIURPVFUXWLQ\´ 
137. Id. at 2632±33. The Court elaborated WKDW EHFDXVH ³WKH HPSOR\HU KDG D
legitimate reason for WKHVHDUFK´DQG³WKHVHDUFKZDVQRWH[FHVVLYHO\LQWUXVLYHLQOLJKW
RIWKDWMXVWLILFDWLRQWKHVHDUFKZRXOGEHµUHJDUGHGDVUHDVRQDEOHDQGQRUPDOLQWKH
private-HPSOR\HUFRQWH[W¶´Id. at 2633 TXRWLQJ2¶&RQQRUY2UWHJD86
(1987) (plurality opinion)).
138. See id. at 2634±35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for its
³UHFLWDWLRQ RI WKH SDUWLHV¶ DUJXPHQWV FRQFHUQLQJ DQG DQ H[FXUVXV RQ WKH FRPSOH[LW\
and consequences of answering, that admittedly irrelevant threshold queVWLRQ´ -XVWLFH
6FDOLD ZDUQV WKDW ORZHU FRXUWV DQG OLWLJDQWV ZLOO UHDG WKH &RXUW¶V GLJUHVVLRQ DV DQ
LQVWUXFWLRQ WR GHOYH LQWR DUJXPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ ³HPSOR\HU SROLFLHV KRZ WKH\ ZHUH
communicated, and whether they were authorized, as well as the latest trends in
HPSOR\HHV¶ XVH RI HOHFWURQLF PHGLD´ Id. 2635±36. These are the same fact-specific
TXHVWLRQVDFRXUWGHFLGLQJDQHPSOR\HH¶VLPSOLHG-in-fact contract right to privacy case
would consider; WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI WKH &RXUW¶V GLJUHVVLRQ PD\ VSUHDG IXUWKHU WKan
Justice Scalia fears.
139. 480 U.S. at 717.
140. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir. 2008), UHY¶G
sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
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³RSHUDWLRQDO UHDOLWLHV´ WR HQKDQFH DQ HPSOR\HH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\
rather than diminish it, is unique.141 This reasoning recognizes that the
actual facts and circumstances of the particular workplace must be
considered to determine whether an employee has a right to privacy
predicated on her reasonable expectation of privacy. Under either a Fourth
Amendment or an implied-in-fact contract framework, the underlying
inquiry is whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy.142
B. An Implied-in-Fact Contract Theory after Quon?
Because Quon was a public sector employee, he was able to invoke
Fourth Amendment protection against his employer.143 The Supreme
&RXUW¶V KDQGOLQJ RI WKH FDVH PD\ VLJQDO WKDW D ZLGHU UDQJH RI SXEOLF
employer conduct will be found reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court distanced itself from the analytical framework that inquired, as a
WKUHVKROGPDWWHULQWRWKHHPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\144
7KLV OLPLWDWLRQ RQ D SXEOLF HPSOR\HH¶V FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DYHQXH IRU UHOLHI
makes the implied contract theory an important alternative for public
employees in many states. Depending on applicable state law, a public
employee in Quon¶V SRVLWLRQ may be able to assert a successful cause of
action based on an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy.145 As
141. Cf. Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that
police officers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that would preclude
EUHDWKDO\]HUWHVWLQJEHFDXVHWKH³RSHUDWLRQDOUHDOLWLHV´RIWKHZRUNSODFHZHUHVXFKWKDW
the officers were already subject to drug testing as a condition of employment); United
States v. Esser, )$SS¶[ WK&LU  KROGLQJWKDWan employee did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her purse where a posted policy
informed individuals that purses were subject to inspection on the property and all
employees were required to read all posted policies); United States v. Ziegler, 456 F.3d
1138, 1143 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that the company policy entitling personnel
WR DGPLQLVWUDWLYH DFFHVV RI HPSOR\HHV¶ FRPSXWHUV GLPLQLVKHG WKH UHDsonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the employee-SODLQWLII¶V FRPSXWHU ,
superseded by 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2007).
142. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628.
143. Id. at 2627.
144. Id. at 2633.
145. Public employees in many states can, in addition to a Fourth Amendment cause
of action, assert a claim based on an implied employment contract. Such a cause of
action is not limited in its application to private sector employees because public sector
employees can enter into contracts with their government employers just as private
sector employees can contract with their employers. See, e.g., Bennett v. Marshall Pub.
Library, 746 F. Supp. 671, 679 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (finding that the public employee
had a claim based on the common law implied contract doctrine); Whittington v. State
'HS W RI 3XE 6DIHW\  3G  10 &W $SS   UHYHUVLQJ WKH WULDO FRXUW¶V
ILQGLQJ WKDW ³just-cause public employees do not have the right to sue their
governmental employer for breach of an implied employment contraFW´ &DEDQHVVY
Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 54±62, 232 P.3d 486, 502±04 (holding that, although the
plaintiff was a public employee, an implied-in-fact employment contract was created
based on an existing employee manual). But see Bernstein v. Lopez, 321 F.3d 903,
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previously discussed, courts vary greatly from state to state in their
recognition and acceptance of the implied-in-fact employment contract.146
Like the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy analysis
employed by the Ninth Circuit and considered by the Supreme Court, an
implied-in-fact contract analysis would be fact-intensive and scrutinize the
HPSOR\HH¶Vreasonable expectation of privacy.147
In an implied contract analysis, a court would take into account the
totality of the circumstances, including the oral assurances, policies, and
practices of the employer.148 The official policy of the police department in
Quon was that of no expectation of privacy, but the informal policy and
actual practice of the department was to refrain from auditing the pagers so
long as the officer paid any overage charges for the pager text messages. 149
Duke orally assured Quon specifically that his pager messages would not
be audited if Quon paid for the overage charges.150 A court may find that
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his pager
messages based on these facts²the Ninth Circuit reached that conclusion
under its Fourth Amendment analysis.151 A court that accepts the existence
of an implied-in-fact contract as an informal, open-ended question might
find this reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to give rise to an
enforceable right to privacy in the content of the messages.
Some courts are more rigid in their implied-in-fact contract analysis,
requiring the facts to formalistically meet contract formation requirements.
It is possible the Quon facts qualify as a bargained-for exchange sufficient
to establish an implied-in-fact contract for privacy in the content of the
pager messages. Applying the facts to the elements of contract formation,
'XNH¶V RUDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ ZDV DQ RIIHU E\ WKH HPSOR\HU152 The terms of
905- WK &LU   ³>,W LV D@ ORQJ-VWDQGLQJ SULQFLSOH RI &DOLIRUQLD ODZ « WKDW
neither an express nor an implied contract can restrict the reasons for, or the manner of,
WHUPLQDWLRQ RI SXEOLF HPSOR\PHQW SURYLGHG E\ &DOLIRUQLD VWDWXWH´ FLWLQJ Portman v.
Cty. Of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1993))).
146. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing that courts differ in
acceptance of implied-in-fact contracts).
147. The underlying issues in Fourth Amendment and implied-in-fact contract
claims are quite distinct. Implied contracts are about an agreement²albeit an implied
one²between the parties, while the Fourth Amendment is about a fundamental right to
be free from unreasonable government intrusion. Nonetheless, these theories share a
common theme in an HPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\
148. See )ROH\ Y ,QWHUDFWLYH 'DWD &RUS  3G   &DO   ³>7@KH
WRWDOLW\ RI WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV GHWHUPLQHV WKH QDWXUH RI WKH FRQWUDFW´  See also supra
note 50±52 and accompanying text.
149. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2008),
UHY¶GVXEQRP City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 906.
152. Id. at 897.
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the offer were: if the employee paid for the overages, then his pager
messages would not be audited.153 By paying for the overages, the
employee was accepting the offer.154 Additionally, payment constituted the
HPSOR\HH¶V consideration.155 7KH HPSOR\HU¶V FRQVLGHUDWLRQ ZDV QRW
auditing the pager messages when the employee met his end of the bargain.
In some jurisdictions, WKHHPSOR\HH¶Vcontinued employment could also be
consideration for the agreement because the arrangement added an
DGGLWLRQDOHPSOR\PHQWWHUPWRWKHSDUWLHV¶FRQWUDFW,WLVQRWQHFHVVDU\WR
use continued employment as consideration in this case because payment to
the employer for the pager overages provided a separate consideration.156
7KHHPSOR\HH¶Vcontract right to privacy in the pager messages prohibited
his employer from auditing the contents of those messages irrespective of
any adverse employment action taken against the employee. In other
words, the employer breaches the contract by reviewing the pager messages
after the employee has paid the overuse charges, not by demoting or
terminating the employee because of the contents of those messages.157
While the facts can be analyzed in terms of offer, acceptance, and
consideration, a court considers the totality of the circumstances to
ascertain if an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy exists; an
HPSOR\HH¶V reasonable expectation of privacy is integral to this assessment.
As with the Fourth Amendment analysis articulated by the Ortega plurality
and discussed in Quon, a reviewing court takes a fact-based approach to
determine if a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. In Quon, the Court
looked at whether the police department issued the pager and had an
153. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625. Cf. Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460,
1464 (10th Cir. 1994) GLVFXVVLQJWKDWDQRIIHURFFXUVZKHQ³WKHHPSOR\HUPDQLIHVW[s]
his willingness to enter into a bargain in such a way as to justify the employee in
understanding that his assent to the bargain was invited by the employer and that the
employee¶s assent [will] conclude the bargain.´ TXRWLQJ &RQW¶O $LU /LQHV ,QF Y
Keenan, 732 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
154. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625 (noting WKDWDIWHU4XRQ¶VHPSOR\HUWRld him that
he would not be audited so long as he paid, Quon paid for the overage charges);
Fineman, supra note 43, at 382 (explaining that an employee can establish acceptance
by performing the terms of the offer).
155. See Fineman, supra note 43, at 383 (³8QGHUHVWDEOLVKHGODZQRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ
beyond performance is required on the part of the promisee in accepting a . . .
FRQWUDFW´ 
156. As discussed in Part III, some courts do not accept continued employment as
sufficient consideration to find an implied employment contract. Other courts have held
that requiring separate consideration is contrary to the general contract principle that
courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
157. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626 (mentioning WKDW 4XRQ ZDV RQO\ ³DOOHJHGO\
GLVFLSOLQHG´IRUKLVH[FHVVLYHSDJHUXVDJH Assuming Quon¶V employment status was
at-will, the department presumably could have terminated him for the excess pager use
without auditing his pager and without breaching his right to privacy in the contents of
the messages.
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RIILFLDOSROLF\RI³QRH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\RUFRQILGHQWLDOLW\´Zith regard
to internet use and E-mail.158 The balancing of these factors will determine
whether the totality of the circumstances created an enforceable implied-infact contract right to privacy in the pager messages.
In a jurisdiction allowing an implied-in-fact contract theory for public
employees, it is possible an employee in Quon¶VSRVLWLRQ would succeed in
a cause of action against his employer for breach of an implied-in-fact
contract right to privacy.159 Although the Supreme Court avoided the
reasonable expectation of privacy issue in its Fourth Amendment analysis,
under an implied-in-fact contract theory, the case turns on whether a court
accepts that the circumstances created a reasonable expectation of privacy
for the employee.160 This depends on the importance a court places on the
HPSOR\HU¶V LQIRUPDO SROLF\ DQG DFWXDO SUDFWLFH RI QRW DXGLWLQJ WKH SDJHU
messages when the employee paid for the overages. In reality, most
employees probably rely on the actual practice of their employers in
forming privacy expectations rather than formal policies²which most
employees may have seen only once when commencing employment.161
This parallels the empirical findings that many employees believe their
legal protection is greater than what at-will employment affords.162 Where
constitutional protections are unavailable or inadequate, an employee,
under circumstances similar to Quon, could argue breach of an implied-infact contract right to privacy.

158. Quon v. Arch Wireless Oper. Corp., 529 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir 2008), UHY¶G
sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
159. The implied-in-fact contract cause of action was unavailable to the Quon
plaintiffs because California law does not permit such a claim for public employees.
See Hoesterey v. City of Cathedral City, No. 93-56239, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 23316,
*11- WK&LU$XJ  ³&DOLIRUQLDODZSURKibits all contractual arrangements
ZKLFK SXUSRUW WR DOWHU WKH WHUPV RI D SXEOLF HPSOR\HH¶V HPSOR\PHQW´  Many
jurisdictions recognize an implied-in-fact contract cause of action for public
employees. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 388 (Cal. 1988)
³>7@KHWRWDOLW\RIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVGHWHUPLQHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´ 
161. See Justin Conforti, Comment, 6RPHERG\¶V:DWFKLQJ0H:RUNSODFH3ULYDF\
Interests, Technology SurveiOODQFH DQG WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW¶V 0LVDSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH
Ortega Test in Quon v. Arch Wireless, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 461, 485 (2009)
³4XRQ VH[SHFWDWLRQZDVUHDVRQDEOHEHFDXVHDQ\HPSOR\HHZKRZRXOGKDYHEHHQWROG
that he could avoid an audit of his messages if he paid the overages himself would
H[SHFWKLVPHVVDJHVWRUHPDLQSULYDWHLIKHNHSWSD\LQJ´ 
162. See supra notes 24±26 and accompanying text (explaining that employees tend
to genuinely believe it is unlawful to dismiss an employee because of the ePSOR\HU¶V
personal dislike of the individual).
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V. WHAT¶S NEXT?: THE VALUE OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT RIGHTS
The implied-in-fact contract may serve a gap-filling function to protect
the privacy of public employees where a constitutional theory fails. While
private employees do not have the constitutional privacy protections
DIIRUGHGWRSXEOLFHPSOR\HHVVRPHVWDWHVUHFRJQL]HDSULYDWHHPSOR\HH¶V
right to privacy in the workplace through the public policy exception to the
at-will employment doctrine.163 RHFRJQLWLRQ RI DQ HPSOR\HH¶V ULJKW WR
privacy as a matter of public policy, however, is often narrowly
construed.164 Where the public policy exception fails to protect employee
privacy, the employee may have recourse by pursuing a breach of an
implied-in-fact contract right to privacy. Implied contract, implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and public policy are distinct
causes of action; some court opinions have, however, merged these theories
in the context of employee privacy protection. The overlap of these theories
is exemplified in the Rulon-Miller decision with regard to the implied-infact contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.165
Another example of blended theories in the employment privacy context is
Luedtke, where the Alaska Supreme Court recognized a public policy
supporting protection of employee privacy and opined that an employer
violation of that public policy could become a breach of the implied

163. See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 621±23 (3d Cir.
  KROGLQJWKDWXQGHU3HQQV\OYDQLDODZLIDGLVFKDUJHLV³UHODWHGWRDVXEVWDQWLDO
and highly offensive invasion of the emplo\HH¶V SULYDF\´ ZKHQ DOO RI WKH IDFWV DQG
circumstances are considered, the termination is in violation of public policy and the
employer may be liable for wrongful discharge); see also Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406
S.E.2d 52, 57 (W. Va. 1990) (finding a public policy right to privacy whereby an
HPSOR\HU PD\ QRW ³Lntrude upon this right of his employee absent some showing of
UHDVRQDEOH JRRG IDLWK REMHFWLYH VXVSLFLRQ´ EXW JUDQWLQJ DQ H[FHSWLRQ ZKHUH WKH
employee is in an occupation involving the safety of others). But see Hennessey v.
Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 589 A.2d 170, 176 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)
FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW SULYDF\ LV DQ LPSRUWDQW VRFLHWDO YDOXH EXW LW LV ³WRR DPRUSKRXV D
VWDQGDUG´WREHDSXEOLFSROLF\H[FHSWLRQWRWKHDW-will employment doctrine).
164. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 74 (2000) (explaining that the public
policy tort is narrow because it is only implicated when the health or safety of the
SXEOLF LV VXIILFLHQWO\ LPSDFWHG  )LQGLQJ WKDW YLRODWLQJ DQ HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDF\ DIIHFWV
the public sufficiently enough to give rise to a public policy cause of action is a broad
understanding of the public policy exception, and many state courts have not accepted
such a broad interpretation. See, e.g., Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840,
846 (8th Cir. 2002) UHMHFWLQJDSXEOLFSROLF\SURWHFWLQJHPSOR\HHSULYDF\EHFDXVH³QR
well-recognized and clear Iowa public policy protects an at-will employee's privacy
interest in a romantic relationship with a co-ZRUNHU´  Hennessey, 589 A.2d at 176
³SULYDF\ WKRXJK DQ LPSRUWDQW YDOXH RI RXU VRFLHW\ LV WRR DPRUSKRXV D VWDQGDUG WR
TXDOLI\DVDFOHDUPDQGDWHRISXEOLFSROLF\´ 
165. See supra notes 91±103 and accompanying text.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing.166 A court might bring the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing into an implied contract or a public
policy analysis where the court finds that the employee was treated
unfairly.
In addition to these common law causes of action, there are statutory
exceptions to employment at-will that protect certain aspects of employee
privacy. Like the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, these
statutes are limited in the scope of employee conduct protected and the
employer actions prohibited; for this reason, the implied-in-fact contract
cause of action is an important protection that an employee may assert
when statutory protections are unavailable.
A. An Open Field for Legislation:
Off-Duty Conduct Statutes and their Limited Impact on
Employee Privacy Rights
Some states have attempted to clarify the law in the area of employee
privacy by legislating for broad employee protection of legal off-duty
conduct.167 2QH RI WKH EURDGHVW LV &RORUDGR¶V RII-duty conduct statute,
which makes it unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee for the
HPSOR\HH¶VODZIXOFRQGXFWRIf-GXW\DQGRIIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VSUHPLVHVXQOHVV
the conduct creates a conflict of interest or relates to a bona fide business
purpose.168 The Colorado statute protects a vast range of off-duty activity
DQG GHSDUWV IURP WKH &RORUDGR FRXUWV¶ WUDGLWLRQDO VXSSRUW of the
employment at-will doctrine.169 These broader statutes can be viewed as
SURWHFWLQJDVSHFWVRIDQHPSOR\HH¶VSULYDWHOLIHLQZKLFKWKHHPSOR\HHZLOO
166. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1992).
167. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2010) (making it unlawful for an
employer to discharge an employee for engaging in any lawful activity off the
HPSOR\HU¶V SUHPLVHV DQG GXULQJ QRQZRUNLQJ KRXUV XQOHVV LW UHODWHV WR D ERQD ILGH
occupational requirement or is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest); N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2009) (making it unlawful for an employer to discharge an
HPSOR\HH EHFDXVH RI WKH HPSOR\HH¶V SROLWLFDO DFWLYLWLHV OHJDO XVH RI FRQVXPDEOH
products off work hours and off work premises, legal recreational activities outside
work, or union membership). See also Sonne, supra note 11, at 170 (explaining that
off-duty conduct statutes were first enacted in the 1990s as protection against
workplace discipline for off-duty smoking but have evolved in some states into
sweeping protection of all legal off-duty conduct).
168. See § 24-34-402.5(1).
169. See generally Jessica Jackson, Comment, &RORUDGR¶V /LIHVW\OH 'LVFULPLQDWLRQ
Statute: A Vast and Muddled Expansion of Traditional Employment Law, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 143, 148±58 (1996) (discussing cases which hold that §24-34-402.5(1) protects
activities such as sexual orientation, membership in the Ku Klux Klan, and interoffice
GDWLQJ ZKLFK ³XQGHUPLQHV DQG FRQWUDGLFWV GHFDGHV RI VWURQJ VXSSRUW IRU HPSOR\PHQW
at-ZLOO SULQFLSOHV´ E\ HIIHFWLYHO\ JLYLQJ HPSOR\HHV WKH YDVW SURWHFWLRQ RI DQ LPSOLHG
covenant of good faith and fair dealing recognized in other states but rejected by
Colorado courts).
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generally have a reasonable expectation to be free from employer intrusion
and involvement.170 For instance, employees typically expect that their
participation in lawful product consumption or lawful recreational activities
outside of work is not RI WKHLU HPSOR\HUV¶ concern when such lawful
conduct does not impact job performance. Perhaps categorizing off-duty
conduct statutes as protecting employee privacy is inaccurate.171 Off-duty
conduct statutes protect personal facts and involvement in personal
activities that may not exactly be private.172 While the conduct protected
may QRW EH UHOHYDQW WR DQ HPSOR\HH¶V MRb capabilities, whether an
employee engages in a particular recreational activity is not really a private
DVSHFWRIWKDWHPSOR\HH¶VOLIH173
Regardless of whether off-duty conduct statutes may accurately be
described as protecting employee privacy, in certain situations, such
statutes may diminish the need for an aggrieved employee to assert a cause
of action based on an implied-in-fact contract for privacy.174 Under the
facts of Rulon-MillerWKHHPSOR\HHZRXOGEHSURWHFWHGE\&RORUDGR¶VRIIduty conduct statute because Rulon-Miller was terminated for engaging in
lawful, off-duty conduct²namely, having a romantic relationship with an
employee of a competitor company.175 Rulon-0LOOHU¶V FRQGXFW GLG QRW
create a conflict of interest or relate to a bona fide business interest of her
employer.176 Therefore, an employee in Rulon-0LOOHU¶V VLWXDWLRQ LQ
&RORUDGRFRXOGDVVHUWSURWHFWLRQXQGHU&RORUDGR¶VRII-duty conduct statute
rather than arguing an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy. However,
Colorado¶V off-duty conduct statute would not impact an employee under

170. See id DW  ³7KH &RORUDGR OHJLVODWXUH V MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU HQDFWLQJ VXFK D
broad statute was that employers should not be able to tell employees what to do on
thHLU RZQ WLPH´  see also, Sonne, supra note 11, at 172 (stating that statutes were
³MXVWLILHG E\ D VHHPLQJO\ LQQRFXRXV DSSHDO DJDLQVW µXQUHDVRQDEOH LQWUXVLRQV LQWR
>ZRUNHUV @OLYHVDZD\IURPZRUN´ DOWHUDWLRQLQRULJLQDO 
171. See Sonne, supra note 11 DW  UHDVRQLQJ WKDW ³OLIHVW\OH´ VWDWXWHV DUH
overbroad and encompass more than privacy abuses).
172. For example, whether or not someone smokes is not necessarily private
information as it might be readily observable during non-work hours. However,
³VPRNHUV¶ULJKWV´VWDWXWHVKDYHH[LVWHGIRUZHOORYHUDGHFDGHSee Jackson, supra note
169, at 143±45.
173. Stated differentlyLQTXLU\LQWRDQHPSOR\HH¶VODZIXORII-duty conduct is not as
intrusive as surveillance or drug testing.
174. See Jackson, supra note 169, at 150±52 (discussing that while Colorado does
recognize an implied employment contract theory based on an employer handbook, this
theory will protect employee privacy only in rare circumstances whereas the Colorado
³OLIHVW\OHGLVFULPLQDWLRQ´ statute protects a wide range of legal activities).
175. Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 527±29 (Ct. App. 1984),
disapproved of by *X]Y%HFKWHO1DW¶O,QF3G &DO .
176. Id. at 533.

60

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:1

the Quon facts EHFDXVH4XRQ¶VFRQGXFWZDVQRWRII-duty.177 5DWKHU4XRQ¶V
conduct occurred while he was on-duty using company property.178 Even
the broadest off-duty conduct statutes cannot adequately protect an
HPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\ZKHUHWKHHPSOR\HUFUHDWHV
that expectation with respect to on-duty activities.
Off-duty conduct statutes are also limited in that they only protect
employees from termination based upon the applicable conduct.179 If an
employee is merely disciplined, he does not have a cause of action under
these statutes.180 In contrast, if an employee has an employment contract²
express or implied²SURWHFWLQJWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSULYDF\WKHHPSOR\HHZLOO
have a breach of contract cause of action against the employer based on the
WHUPVRIWKHSDUWLHV¶FRQWUDFWZLWKRXWWKHSUHUHTXLVLWHWKDWWKHHPSOR\HHEH
terminated to assert her claim. While state legislatures are providing greater
statutory protection to workers, there are limitations to these legislative
protections that can be supplemented by common law causes of action like
the implied-in-fact contract.
Due to the problems that the jurisdictional differences of state off-duty
conduct legislation create for multistate companies, arguments have been
made for the passage of federal legislation regarding employee privacy
rights with respect to off-duty conduct.181 While such federal legislation
177. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2626 (2010) (observing that
GXULQJWKHUHYLHZRI4XRQ¶VWH[WPHVVDJHVDOOPHVVDJHV4XRQVHQWZKLOHRII-duty were
QRWUHYLHZHGGXULQJ4XRQ¶VGLVFLSOLQDU\SURFHGXUHV 
178. Id. To be sure, some of the conduct probably occurred off-duty because Quon
had access to the pager during his non-working hours; however, because the pager was
provided by the employer for business purposes, the conduct would fall under the
statutory exception of being for a bona fide business purpose. See COLO. REV. STAT. §
24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2010) (exempting discharges that relate to the furtherance of a
³ERQDILGHRFFXSDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQW´ 
179. Compare § 24-34-402.5(1) (limiting WKH VWDWXWH¶V application to employee
termination), with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2009) (applying 1HZ<RUN¶V
off-duty conduct statute to refusals to hire, discharge, and discrimination).
180. &RORUDGR¶VRII-duty conduct statute would not protect Quon because he was not
WHUPLQDWHGDIWHUKLVHPSOR\HU¶VLQWUXVLRQRIKLVSULYDF\LQWHUHVWVSee Quon, 130 S. Ct.
at 2626 (establishing that Quon was disciplined as opposed to terminated for his
actions).
181. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?:
Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions,
6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 680±83 (2004) (proposing uniform employee privacy
legislation to address the significant variance of employee privacy issues across the
country); see also Rives, supra note 28 at 554, 563±64 (calling for specific federal
OHJLVODWLRQSURWHFWLQJHPSOR\HHV¶ULJKWWRHQJDJHLQODZIXORII-duty conduct that would
³VWDQGDUGL]>H@ HPSOR\HH SULYDF\ ULJKWV DFURVV VWDWH OLQHV´  Other commentators have
opined that state off-duty conduct statutes were enacted prematurely and unnecessarily.
See Sonne, supra note 11, at 183±84 (citing evidence that employers realize it is
FRXQWHUSURGXFWLYH WR KDYH RYHUO\ LQWUXVLYH SROLFLHV ZLWK UHJDUG WR HPSOR\HHV¶ SULYDWH
lives). Additionally, survey data indicates that employers and employees have similar
expectations with regard to what information is acceptable for an employer to gather
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would advance the goal of standardizing the protection afforded employees
in their activities outside of work, it would not pURWHFW HPSOR\HHV¶
reasonable expectations of privacy in activities conducted while on-duty.
Future legislation in this area likely will focus on discrete classes of
information²as most privacy legislation does. There is not a
comprehensive legislative answer, but the implied-in-fact contract may be
available to fill some gaps left by attempted legislation that fails to protect
HPSOR\HHV¶UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQVRISULYDF\
B. The Limits of Implied-in-Fact Contract Rights
This Article has proposed that the central theme of employment actions
brought by public and private employees asserting privacy protection is the
presence of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Because of this
commonality, the implied-in-fact contract theory can supplement where
other causes of action fail to protect employee privacy. In determining
whether an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy exists, courts look at
the totality of the circumstances.182 Whether the employee had a reasonable
H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ RU FRXOG ³UHDVRQDEO\ UHO\´ RQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
assurances, policies, and practices, is important in deciding whether an
implied-in-fact contract right to privacy exists.183 The question is whether
WKH SDUWLHV KDG DQ HQIRUFHDEOH DJUHHPHQW SURWHFWLQJ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
privacy; to answer that question, courts look at the circumstances and the
HPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQVIf the employee cannot demonstrate a
UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ EDVHG XSRQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V DFWLRQV WKH
employee will not prevail.184 An employee that did not subjectively expect
privacy will be less likely to feel wronged by what might otherwise be
and examine about an employee. Sonne, supra note 11, at 184±85. The lack of case law
on the issue is probably the best evidence that sweeping, federal legislation would be
an inefficient endeavor. Id. at 185. Shepardizing ³COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34402.5(1)(a) (2010 ´ yields only 23 case results and 66 law review articles, indicating it
is of greater academic concern that employees receive this protection than a practical
problem. Statute last Shepardized using LexisNexis on February 21, 2011.
182. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 363, 388 (Cal. 1988)
³>7@KHWRWDOLW\RIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVGHWHUPLQHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´ 
183. See Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct. App. 1984)
GLVFXVVLQJKRZDQHPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\ZLOOEHLPSRUWDQWWR
DQ LPSOLHG FRYHQDQW RI JRRG IDLWK DQG IDLU GHDOLQJ FODLP EHFDXVH WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQZLOOLPSDFWWKHFRXUW¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKHHPSOR\HH
was treated unfairly), disapproved of by *X]Y%HFKWHO1DW¶O,QF3G &DO
2000).
184. See Nancy J. King et al., Workplace Privacy and Discrimination Issues Related
to Genetic Data: A Comparative Law Study of the European Union and the United
States, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 79, 122 (2006) (explaining that under other privacy causes of
action which an employee can assert against an employer, such as the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion, an employer can avoid liability by reducing employee privacy
expectations).
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FRQVLGHUHGWKHHPSOR\HU¶VLQIULQJHPHQWRIVXFKSULYDF\DQGEHOHVVOLNHO\
to sue the employer.185
To avoid liability, emplR\HUV VKRXOG EH FRJQL]DQW RI WKHLU HPSOR\HHV¶
expectations of privacy and manage those expectations appropriately.
When an employer is successful in this endeavor, it will not be subject to
liability for violating employee privacy rights because the employee will
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy on which to base a claim. If an
HPSOR\HU SXEOLF RU SULYDWH FDQ VXFFHVVIXOO\ PDQDJH LWV HPSOR\HHV¶
expectations of privacy, courts will be less inclined to find the employer
liable, and the employee will be less likely to file suit against the employer
LQ WKH ILUVW SODFH )URP WKH HPSOR\HU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH PDQDJLQJ HPSOR\HH
expectations of privacy is the first line of defense against liability for
alleged infringements of employee privacy; it is also in the best interest of
the employee if the parties have similar expectations with regard to
employee privacy.186 Setting clear and definite company policies while
ensuring that all employees are aware of these policies aligns the
expectations of the parties and DYRLGVHPSOR\HHV¶H[SHFWDWLRQVRISULYDF\
from being inflated beyond what the employer intends. Additionally,
employers may require that supervisors not deviate from the formal
policies.187
185. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective
Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 293 (2003) (explaining that when terminated or
laid off employees perceive the process as fair, they are less likely to sue their former
employer); Ann M. Anderson, Whose Malice Counts?: Kolstad and the Limits of
Vicarious Liability for Title VII Punitive Damages, 78 N.C. L. REV. 799, 826±27 (2000)
(asserting that, in the discrimination context, when employer policies are implemented
in good faith, employees are more receptive and less likely to file suit); Worth, supra
note 25, at 415 (observing WKDW³DZRUNHUZKROHDYHVKDSS\LVOHVVOLNHO\WRVXH.´ 
186. See Eric Krell, Privacy Matters, 55 HR MAG., no. 2, Feb. 2010 at 43, 44
(declaring that managing employee privacy expectations is an important matter for
FRPSDQLHVIRUPDQ\UHDVRQVEHFDXVH³>W@KHULVNVRIPLVPDQDJLQJHPSOR\HHV¶SULYDF\
can be severe: lost revenue, lost productivity, legal or regulatory actions, declines in
EUDQG YDOXH DQG VKDUHKROGHU YDOXH DQG UHFUXLWLQJ DQG UHWHQWLRQ SUREOHPV´  %HVLGHV
legal ramifications, effective management in the area of privacy expectations will have
benefits to a business in terms of productivity and company value. Human resource
professionals realize it is important that privacy expectations of employers and
employees be aligned, and it is a bad business practice for employers to be overly
intrusive and unnecessarily monitor employee activities. See id. (noting the importance
of aligning the privacy expectations of employers and employees). See also Declan C.
Leonard & Angela H. France, Balancing Business Interests with Employee Privacy
Rights, LEGAL REP. (6RF¶\for Human Res. Mgmt., Alexandria, Va.), Jun. 1, 2003, at 2,
available at http://www.shrm.org/Publications/LegalReport/Pages/CMS_005109.aspx
(explaining that unnecessary monitoring can create poor employee morale, and
companies should justify all monitoring in terms of protecting a legitimate business
interest and communicate this to its employees). Effective communication between
employees and employers is important to accomplishing these goals.
187. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (observing that,
absent Duke¶V contradiction of WKH GHSDUWPHQW¶VIRUPDO SROLF\ ZLWK KLV RZQ LQIRUPDO
policy, determining whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy would likely
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It may be in the best interest of the employer²in terms of morale and
productivity²to intentionally provide employees with certain expectations
of privacy. Inevitably, the realities of the workplace and actual practices
cause managers and supervisors to deviate from formal company policies;
as in Quon, there will invariably be situations where formal policies differ
from realities in the workplace. When an employee has a reasonable
H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ EDVHG XSRQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V FRQGXFW DQG SROLFLHV
some courts will find that sufficient to recognize an implied-in-fact contract
right to employee privacy.188 Alternatively, contract rights for employee
privacy need not be derived from the circumstances; employers and
employees can explicitly agree to certain privacy rights in an express
contract.
In an employment relationship, private ordering is perhaps the
preeminent way for the parties to have coinciding expectations about their
relationship. OQH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK DQ HPSOR\HU FDQ PDQDJH LWV HPSOR\HHV¶
expectations of privacy is through private ordering.189 While employment
law has moved toward greater government mandates and regulation of the
relationship,190 WKHUXOHVVHWE\WKHSDUWLHV¶WKHPVHOYHVDUHVWLOOLPSRUWDQWLQ
defining their relative rights.191 Private ordering can be accomplished
through an express contract between the parties and may provide an
employee with privacy protection. While an express contract right to
employee privacy is possible, it is unlikely that an employer will expressly
not have been a difficult issue for the Court to decide).
188. See Fineman, supra note 43, at 364 (explaining that some courts find that
³LPSOLHGFRQWUDFWVDUHHQIRUFHDEOHEHFDXVHRIHPSOR\HHV¶UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQV´ 
189. Private ordering is another term for the freedom of contract, or the ability of the
parties to define the terms of their relationship. See, e.g., Steven H. Kropp,
Deconstructing Racism in American Society ± The Role Labor Law Might Have Played
(But Did Not) in Ending Race Discrimination: A Partial Explanation and Historical
Commentary, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 397 (2002) (discussing private
ordering as one means for ending workplace racial prejudice).
190. See GLYNN ET AL., supra note 34 DW [[Y ³>7@KH ODZ JRYHUQLQJ WKH
employment relationship has developed away from private ordering and toward greater
government regulation.´ 
191. See Kohler & Finkin, supra note 111, at 382 (explaining that employment law
LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV LV IRXQGHG RQ D EHOLHI LQ WKH ³HIILFLHQF\ RI SULYDWH RUGHULQJ´ 
Under Fourth Amendment case law precedent for public employees, private ordering
SOD\VDQLQWHJUDO UROHLQWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSULYDF\SURWHFWLRQEHFDXVHWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV
RIWKHZRUNSODFHGHWHUPLQHWKHHPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\ Conforti,
supra note 167, at  ³[B]ecause an employee¶s privacy expectation must be
reasonable before he has any Fourth Amendment protection, and because the Ortega
framework works on a contextual rather than a categorical approach, private ordering
has defined workplace privacy. Therefore, employers may alter the context of a given
workplace to eliminate employee privacy expectations.´   7KLV DVVHVVPHQW PD\ EH
LQFRUUHFW LQ OLJKW RI WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ Quon to refrain from embracing the
analytical framework set forth by the Ortega plurality. See supra note 134 and
accompanying text (explaining that Quon abandoned the Ortega approach).
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contract to give employees privacy protection.
When an employer fails to adequately manage employee expectations of
privacy, the implied-in-fact contract cause of action may be claimed where
there are no applicable statutory, constitutional, or tort protections. Because
WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV RI WKH SDUWLHV¶ UHODWLRQVKLS GHWHUPLQH DQ HPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy, the interaction of the parties and the
WHUPVVHWE\WKHHPSOR\HUDQGWKHHPSOR\HHGHILQHWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSULYDF\
rights. Naturally, employees acquire expectations based on the day-to-day
practices of the workplace and reasonably expect that employers will act in
accordance with prior conduct. If an employer consistently acts in a manner
contrary to a formal policy, as was the situation in Quon DQ HPSOR\HH¶V
expectation may reasonably align with the actual practices of the workplace
rather than the formal policies of the company.192
When an employer acts inconsistently with prior representations or
practices, the employer sets itself up for potential liability for breach of an
implied contract right because the employer¶V actions may be at odds with
WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\  An implied-in-fact
contract cause of action is available to employees based on the terms of the
contract set by the parties, and a court will ascertain those terms by
considering the circumstances of the workplace and whether the employee
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of any statutory, constitutional, or tort protection available to
an employee, an implied-in-fact contract cause of action may be available
when the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy based upon the
circumstances of the workplace. Because the claim is fact-dependant, an
implied-in-fact contract theory offers an employee more flexible protection
than other causes of action. In light of the trend toward greater government
regulation over the employment relationship, it is probable that further
federal and state legislation will be passed in an effort to provide
employees with heightened privacy protection. Inevitably, there will be
gaps in protection afforded by these statutes. Like the off-duty conduct
statutes, new legislation may only protect employees from termination.193
:KHUH D VWDWXWRU\ VFKHPH GRHV QRW DGHTXDWHO\ SURWHFW DQ HPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy, the implied-in-fact contract argument is
available.
Some jurisdictions may methodically require that the facts meet the
192. See supra Part IV (discussing KRZ4XRQ¶VH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\ZDVFUHDWHGE\
KLVVXSHUYLVRU¶VUHSHDWHGGHYLDWLRQVIURPWKHHPSOR\HU¶VDFWXDOSROLFLHV).
193. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2010) (applying only to wrongful
terminations).
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elements of contract formation including an offer, an acceptance, and
consideration. Even in these jurisdictions, the HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH
expectation of privacy will be essential in determining whether the parties
reached an enforceable agreement regarding employee privacy. The
UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI DQ HPSOR\HH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ is determined by
the circumstances and the realities of the workplace. In Quon, the Supreme
Court opined as to circumstances creating reasonable privacy
expectations.194 7KH&RXUW¶VGLFWDPD\SURYHSHUVXDVLYHWRIXWXUHLPSOLHGin-fact contract causes of action. In the evolving legal climate with the
trend toward increasing employee protection and recognizing greater
privacy protection for all citizens, some courts will likely be more
accepting of implied-in-fact contracts for employee privacy. When an
employer fails to manage employee privacy expectations, the implied-infact contract may be the only cause of action available to protect an
HPSOR\HH¶Vreasonable expectation of privacy.

194. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (noting that a court
must decide if oral assurances contrary to an established employer policy do, in fact,
override the established policy).

